Cyber Protection Amendment Act: Resurrecting Repressive Speech Controls in Bangladesh

In April 2026, the Parliament of Bangladesh enacted the Cyber Protection Act 2026, ostensibly to dismantle the draconian legacy of the widely criticized Digital Security Act 2018 (DSA). However, within months of its passage, the government introduced a set of proposed amendments that systematically revive the most repressive provisions of the DSA under new nomenclature. The proposed amendments re-criminalize defamation, invent subjective offenses such as "insult" and "bullying," and introduce severe penalties—up to 10 years imprisonment and a BDT 4 million fine—for disseminating "rumors" and "disinformation." Drawing upon comparative human rights jurisprudence, civil society petitions, and documented histories of custodial violence under past cyber laws, this policy paper argues that the proposed amendments replicate and, in certain aspects, exceed the coercive architecture of the DSA. The paper concludes with actionable recommendations to realign national cybersecurity legislation with international human rights standards.

1. Introduction

The passage of the Cyber Protection Act in April 2026 was widely welcomed as a historic departure from the Digital Security Act 2018, which for years had functioned as an instrument of state intimidation against journalists, dissenters, and human rights defenders. Although Section 20 was repealed on July 1, 2026, the ICT Division published a fresh set of regressive amendments in September 2026. A five-member cabinet committee, chaired by the Minister of Posts, Telecommunications, and Information Technology, was formed to review the draft.

The proposed revisions reintroduce criminal defamation, establish nebulously defined offenses around "insult" and "bullying," expand extrajudicial content-blocking powers, grant summary jurisdiction to executive mobile courts, and eliminate the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) from the National Cyber Protection Council. These amendments fundamentally contravene the constitutional protections of speech guaranteed under Article 39 of the Constitution of Bangladesh and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

2. The Digital Security Act (DSA): A Record of Institutional Abuse

The DSA was the direct institutional successor to the notorious Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act 2006. Between October 2018 and September 2024, over 4,500 individuals were subjected to judicial harassment and arbitrary arrest under the DSA. The law fostered an pervasive climate of self-censorship, altering how citizens engaged in public life.

A legal study by the Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch Initiative and the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS) analyzing 222 cases involving 396 journalists revealed that the statute was overwhelmingly exploited by political elites to silence investigative reporting. Accused individuals were routinely detained without warrants, subjected to prolonged pre-trial incarceration, and subjected to custodial torture. Renowned photojournalist Shahidul Alam spent 108 days in custody in 2018 under Section 57 for public commentary. Similarly, journalists in regional districts faced indefinite incarceration and career destruction before being exonerated.

2.1 The Custodial Death of Mushtaq Ahmed

The lethal extremity of the DSA is epitomized by writer and commentator Mushtaq Ahmed. Arrested in May 2020 for criticizing the government's pandemic response on social media, Ahmed was denied bail six times before dying in custody at Kashimpur High Security Prison on February 25, 2021. His co-accused, political cartoonist Ahmed Kabir Kishore, was released on bail following widespread international outrage and subsequently provided testimony detailing severe custodial torture, which resulted in permanent hearing loss and physical trauma.

2.2 The Chilling Effect on Independent Media

CGS documentation shows that between October 2018 and September 2023, 1,436 cases were filed under the DSA, implicating at least 4,520 people. Journalists constituted roughly one-third of all accused individuals. Vague statutory formulations regarding "deteriorating law and order" and "hurting religious sentiments" provided law enforcement with unconstrained discretion to suppress legitimate investigative journalism.

3. Proposed Amendments (2026): Institutionalizing Repression

A coalition of 19 leading human rights organizations—including Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), BLAST, and ARTICLE 19—has characterized the September 2026 draft amendments as more regressive than the original DSA.

• Criminal Defamation (Section 25): The amendment broadens Section 25 (originally dedicated to addressing sexual extortion and non-consensual imagery) to encompass "digital defamation," imposing up to 5 years imprisonment and a BDT 2 million fine (doubled if targeting women or minors). Re-criminalizing online speech already governed by Section 499 of the Penal Code effectively outlaws investigative journalism and public interest satire.

• Subjective Offenses of "Insult" and "Bullying" (Section 25): The draft criminalizes conduct that causes "mental distress," "isolation," or perceived diminishment of "social status." These subjective definitions allow authorities to categorize critical journalism, consumer complaints, or political parody as illegal harassment.

• Disinformation and "Rumors" (Section 26A): Mandating up to 10 years imprisonment and a BDT 4 million fine, this section penalizes publishing "unverified information." Criminalizing reportage during fluid public crises strips investigative journalists of foundational protections and guarantees pervasive self-censorship.

• Unilateral Content Takedowns (Section 8): Executive agencies are empowered to block digital content based on mere "suspicion" of legal violations, removing the statutory requirement to maintain a public registry of blocked websites and terminating transparency safeguards.

• Mobile Courts and Executive Immunity: Executive magistrates operating under the Mobile Court Act are granted jurisdiction to summarily try speech offenses, bypassing standard evidentiary procedures. Concurrently, the NHRC's seat on the National Cyber Protection Council is abolished, while public officials are granted sweeping legal immunity for actions taken under "good faith."

4. Comparative Jurisprudence: Regional Lessons

• India’s Shreya Singhal Precedent (2015): The Supreme Court of India struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, ruling that unconstitutionally vague speech statutes that generate a chilling effect violate fundamental constitutional guarantees. The proposed Bangladeshi provisions on "insult" and "rumors" fail every legal test established in Shreya Singhal.

• Singapore's POFMA Model: While Singapore’s Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) includes limited mechanisms for judicial appeal, its implementation has drawn intense global criticism for disproportionately targeting political opposition. The proposed Bangladeshi draft lacks even these procedural appeals, authorizing unchecked executive censorship.

5. Stakeholder Impact Assessment

• Journalists and Media Houses: Facing up to 10-year prison terms for publishing breaking, unverified news, media organizations will be forced into defensive compliance and extensive self-censorship.

• Satirists and Writers: The vague parameters of "insult" will inevitably penalize creative expression, political dissent, and literary satire.

• Civil Society and Citizens: Human rights defenders documenting state abuses risk prosecution under "anti-rumor" provisions, with summary sentencing executed through mobile courts.

6. Actionable Policy Recommendations

1. Withdraw Proposed Amendments: The draft revisions must be immediately shelved to initiate transparent, inclusive consultations with legal experts, media workers, and civil society.

2. Decriminalize Speech Offenses in Section 25: Remove all provisions regarding defamation, insult, and subjective bullying from cyber statutes, leaving legitimate reputation disputes to standard civil adjudication.

3. Repeal Proposed Section 26A: Abolish the offense of spreading "rumors" and "unverified information" to preserve independent investigative reporting.

4. Mandate Prior Judicial Authorization for Content Takedowns: Require independent judicial warrants prior to blocking online content, while reinstating public registries for all state-directed censorship.

5. Reconstitute the National Cyber Protection Council: Restore the statutory representation of the NHRC and independent technical experts while repealing administrative "good-faith" immunity clauses.

6. Harmonize Domestic Law with the ICCPR: Ensure that all provisions restricting speech comply with the international legal principles of legality, legitimate purpose, and strict proportionality under Article 19 of the ICCPR.

Conclusion

The proposed Cyber Protection (Amendment) Act 2026 threatens to reverse hard-won democratic progress by codifying an unconstrained censorship regime. The custodial death of Mushtaq Ahmed remains an enduring warning against granting state institutions ambiguous legal tools to silence dissent. Bangladesh must decouple technical cybersecurity from the policing of public thought, safeguarding digital infrastructure without compromising constitutional freedoms.

Author || Convener, DSA Victims Network; Chief Executive Officer, SeaBeach77 Limited.

Editor's Note || The legal evaluations and arguments articulated in this research article reflect the author's own policy analysis. Published with editorial standardization to support informed discourse on legislative reform, freedom of expression, and international human rights compliance.