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Cyber Protection Amendment Act: Resurrecting Repressive Speech Controls in Bangladesh

Senior Staff Correspondent — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 01:21:16 +0600

Proposed amendments reintroduce criminal defamation and subjective offenses of "insult" and "bullying."
Publishing "unverified information" carries catastrophic penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment and a BDT 4 million fine.
State agencies are granted unchecked authority to block digital content based on mere suspicion without public disclosure.
The National Human Rights Commission is removed from the governing council, while state officials receive broad immunity.
The draft directly contravenes the Indian Supreme Court's Shreya Singhal precedent and Article 19 of the ICCPR.

In April 2026, the Parliament of Bangladesh enacted the Cyber Protection Act 2026, ostensibly to dismantle the draconian legacy of the widely criticized Digital Security Act 2018 (DSA). However, within months of its passage, the government introduced a set of proposed amendments that systematically revive the most repressive provisions of the DSA under new nomenclature. The proposed amendments re-criminalize defamation, invent subjective offenses such as "insult" and "bullying," and introduce severe penalties—up to 10 years imprisonment and a BDT 4 million fine—for disseminating "rumors" and "disinformation." Drawing upon comparative human rights jurisprudence, civil society petitions, and documented histories of custodial violence under past cyber laws, this policy paper argues that the proposed amendments replicate and, in certain aspects, exceed the coercive architecture of the DSA. The paper concludes with actionable recommendations to realign national cybersecurity legislation with international human rights standards.

1. Introduction

The passage of the Cyber Protection Act in April 2026 was widely welcomed as a historic departure from the Digital Security Act 2018, which for years had functioned as an instrument of state intimidation against journalists, dissenters, and human rights defenders. Although Section 20 was repealed on July 1, 2026, the ICT Division published a fresh set of regressive amendments in September 2026. A five-member cabinet committee, chaired by the Minister of Posts, Telecommunications, and Information Technology, was formed to review the draft.

The proposed revisions reintroduce criminal defamation, establish nebulously defined offenses around "insult" and "bullying," expand extrajudicial content-blocking powers, grant summary jurisdiction to executive mobile courts, and eliminate the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) from the National Cyber Protection Council. These amendments fundamentally contravene the constitutional protections of speech guaranteed under Article 39 of the Constitution of Bangladesh and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

2. The Digital Security Act (DSA): A Record of Institutional Abuse

The DSA was the direct institutional successor to the notorious Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act 2006. Between October 2018 and September 2024, over 4,500 individuals were subjected to judicial harassment and arbitrary arrest under the DSA. The law fostered an pervasive climate of self-censorship, altering how citizens engaged in public life.

A legal study by the Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch Initiative and the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS) analyzing 222 cases involving 396 journalists revealed that the statute was overwhelmingly exploited by political elites to silence investigative reporting. Accused individuals were routinely detained without warrants, subjected to prolonged pre-trial incarceration, and subjected to custodial torture. Renowned photojournalist Shahidul Alam spent 108 days in custody in 2018 under Section 57 for public commentary. Similarly, journalists in regional districts faced indefinite incarceration and career destruction before being exonerated.

2.1 The Custodial Death of Mushtaq Ahmed

The lethal extremity of the DSA is epitomized by writer and commentator Mushtaq Ahmed. Arrested in May 2020 for criticizing the government's pandemic response on social media, Ahmed was denied bail six times before dying in custody at Kashimpur High Security Prison on February 25, 2021. His co-accused, political cartoonist Ahmed Kabir Kishore, was released on bail following widespread international outrage and subsequently provided testimony detailing severe custodial torture, which resulted in permanent hearing loss and physical trauma.

2.2 The Chilling Effect on Independent Media

CGS documentation shows that between October 2018 and September 2023, 1,436 cases were filed under the DSA, implicating at least 4,520 people. Journalists constituted roughly one-third of all accused individuals. Vague statutory formulations regarding "deteriorating law and order" and "hurting religious sentiments" provided law enforcement with unconstrained discretion to suppress legitimate investigative journalism.

3. Proposed Amendments (2026): Institutionalizing Repression

A coalition of 19 leading human rights organizations—including Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), BLAST, and ARTICLE 19—has characterized the September 2026 draft amendments as more regressive than the original DSA.

Criminal Defamation (Section 25): The amendment broadens Section 25 (originally dedicated to addressing sexual extortion and non-consensual imagery) to encompass "digital defamation," imposing up to 5 years imprisonment and a BDT 2 million fine (doubled if targeting women or minors). Re-criminalizing online speech already governed by Section 499 of the Penal Code effectively outlaws investigative journalism and public interest satire.
Subjective Offenses of "Insult" and "Bullying" (Section 25): The draft criminalizes conduct that causes "mental distress," "isolation," or perceived diminishment of "social status." These subjective definitions allow authorities to categorize critical journalism, consumer complaints, or political parody as illegal harassment.
Disinformation and "Rumors" (Section 26A): Mandating up to 10 years imprisonment and a BDT 4 million fine, this section penalizes publishing "unverified information." Criminalizing reportage during fluid public crises strips investigative journalists of foundational protections and guarantees pervasive self-censorship.
Unilateral Content Takedowns (Section 8): Executive agencies are empowered to block digital content based on mere "suspicion" of legal violations, removing the statutory requirement to maintain a public registry of blocked websites and terminating transparency safeguards.
Mobile Courts and Executive Immunity: Executive magistrates operating under the Mobile Court Act are granted jurisdiction to summarily try speech offenses, bypassing standard evidentiary procedures. Concurrently, the NHRC's seat on the National Cyber Protection Council is abolished, while public officials are granted sweeping legal immunity for actions taken under "good faith."

4. Comparative Jurisprudence: Regional Lessons

India’s Shreya Singhal Precedent (2015): The Supreme Court of India struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, ruling that unconstitutionally vague speech statutes that generate a chilling effect violate fundamental constitutional guarantees. The proposed Bangladeshi provisions on "insult" and "rumors" fail every legal test established in Shreya Singhal.
Singapore's POFMA Model: While Singapore’s Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) includes limited mechanisms for judicial appeal, its implementation has drawn intense global criticism for disproportionately targeting political opposition. The proposed Bangladeshi draft lacks even these procedural appeals, authorizing unchecked executive censorship.

5. Stakeholder Impact Assessment

Journalists and Media Houses: Facing up to 10-year prison terms for publishing breaking, unverified news, media organizations will be forced into defensive compliance and extensive self-censorship.
Satirists and Writers: The vague parameters of "insult" will inevitably penalize creative expression, political dissent, and literary satire.
Civil Society and Citizens: Human rights defenders documenting state abuses risk prosecution under "anti-rumor" provisions, with summary sentencing executed through mobile courts.

6. Actionable Policy Recommendations

Withdraw Proposed Amendments: The draft revisions must be immediately shelved to initiate transparent, inclusive consultations with legal experts, media workers, and civil society.
Decriminalize Speech Offenses in Section 25: Remove all provisions regarding defamation, insult, and subjective bullying from cyber statutes, leaving legitimate reputation disputes to standard civil adjudication.
Repeal Proposed Section 26A: Abolish the offense of spreading "rumors" and "unverified information" to preserve independent investigative reporting.
Mandate Prior Judicial Authorization for Content Takedowns: Require independent judicial warrants prior to blocking online content, while reinstating public registries for all state-directed censorship.
Reconstitute the National Cyber Protection Council: Restore the statutory representation of the NHRC and independent technical experts while repealing administrative "good-faith" immunity clauses.
Harmonize Domestic Law with the ICCPR: Ensure that all provisions restricting speech comply with the international legal principles of legality, legitimate purpose, and strict proportionality under Article 19 of the ICCPR.

Conclusion

The proposed Cyber Protection (Amendment) Act 2026 threatens to reverse hard-won democratic progress by codifying an unconstrained censorship regime. The custodial death of Mushtaq Ahmed remains an enduring warning against granting state institutions ambiguous legal tools to silence dissent. Bangladesh must decouple technical cybersecurity from the policing of public thought, safeguarding digital infrastructure without compromising constitutional freedoms.

Author || Convener, DSA Victims Network; Chief Executive Officer, SeaBeach77 Limited.

Editor's Note || The legal evaluations and arguments articulated in this research article reflect the author's own policy analysis. Published with editorial standardization to support informed discourse on legislative reform, freedom of expression, and international human rights compliance.

Opening the Digital Banking Gateway: Expanding Market Competition and Financial Inclusion

Senior Staff Correspondent — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 00:51:17 +0600

Granting preliminary LOIs to five digital banks is a progressive step, but the market must not be capped permanently at this initial ceiling.
Maintaining an open, merit-based entry path for qualified applicants fosters price competition, innovation, and service quality.
Enforcing the BDT 300 crore minimum paid-up capital requirement must be paired with thorough audits of cyber resilience.
Given the lack of physical branches, full interoperability with nationwide agent networks is vital for physical cash transactions.
Developmental success should be measured by collateral-free microcredit access for rural and female entrepreneurs, not vanity app download numbers.

The decision by Bangladesh Bank to grant preliminary regulatory consent—in the form of Letters of Intent (LOIs)—to five proposed digital banks is a commendable policy milestone. The central bank's subsequent responsibility is to preserve a transparent, merit-based entry pipeline for other qualified applicants, ensuring that these specialized digital institutions generate transformative improvements in citizens' financial lives.

Consider a rural woman entrepreneur: she frequently receives client remittances, pays local wholesale suppliers, and manages domestic expenditures through Mobile Financial Services (MFS). Yet, when she requires modest institutional credit to scale her trade, she faces burdensome paperwork, physical collateral requirements, and remote brick-and-mortar branches beyond her reach. Assessing the genuine potential of digital banking in Bangladesh requires confronting this structural divide: digital transactional velocity has expanded exponentially, but has productive economic opportunity kept pace?

Within this context, the central bank's decision to issue LOIs to five entities—specifically DK, bKash, Nova, Boost, and Kori Digital Bank—is a pragmatic initial step. However, an LOI is not a definitive operating license. Regulatory operational clearances must remain contingent upon strict capital adequacy compliance, infrastructural readiness, and comprehensive cybersecurity audits.

While this marks a critical milestone, capping the market ceiling arbitrarily at five players would be a policy misstep. Out of the 12 applications submitted in the second phase, those denied LOIs in this initial cohort should have a clear, predictable avenue for future evaluation upon rectifying compliance shortfalls. Such evaluations must be governed by published benchmarks, rigorous due diligence, and absolute regulatory impartiality.

The argument for licensing additional qualified digital banks is not driven merely by an interest in swelling headcount. Simply granting access to a few players guarantees neither lower transaction tariffs, superior service quality, nor proactive rural outreach. Conversely, maintaining an accessible regulatory runway for capable entrants establishes authentic, competition-driven market discipline across pricing, consumer care, and technological innovation. Under a competitive regime, consumers secure genuine alternatives to evaluate account parameters, remittance costs, and micro-lending facilities.

The ultimate benchmark of market competition is identifying who captures its tangible dividends. Engineering sleek smartphone interfaces for urban professionals will not satisfy the socio-economic mission of digital banking. Architectural roadmaps must prioritize smallholder farmers, marginalized cottage enterprises, women micro-entrepreneurs, differently-abled citizens, and users with limited digital literacy. Simplified vernacular interfaces, low-cost micro-transactions, 24/7 localized human customer support, and accessible grievance channels are indispensable.

Although digital banks dispense with physical branches, the daily reality of a cash-dependent grassroots economy cannot be dismissed. Seamless interoperability with legacy banking channels, national payment switches, and nationwide agent-banking infrastructure is vital for physical cash deposits and withdrawals. If opening a digital account takes minutes but retrieving physical cash during emergencies remains unreliable, systemic public trust will inevitably erode.

Equally paramount is structural cybersecurity and data privacy. As digital banks aggregate citizen identities and transaction streams, the systemic risks of identity theft, account hijacking, infrastructure outages, and sophisticated fraud escalate. Depositors must retain full visibility over data telemetry and usage consent. Furthermore, dispute resolution must be instantaneous; while the interface of modern banking resides in an app, institutional accountability cannot be outsourced to automated chatbot loops.

Bangladesh Bank must balance two regulatory priorities concurrently. First, rigorously evaluate the recapitalization compliance—where minimum paid-up capital has been scaled from BDT 125 crore to BDT 300 crore—alongside the corporate governance and technical architectures of the initial LOI recipients. Second, articulate a transparent roadmap for future licensing cohorts. Explicitly defining why applications are rejected and how technical deficiencies can be cured will preserve institutional transparency and shield central bank decision-making from speculative criticism.

The operational efficacy of these prospective banks cannot be measured by app installation counts or dormant account metrics alone. Success must be audited by tangible parameters: the frequency of active rural usage, the accessibility of uncollateralized credit for micro-enterprises, reductions in end-user service costs, and the velocity of dispute remediation. Maintaining an account and acquiring the financial sovereignty to transform one's livelihood represent two entirely different developmental milestones.

Bangladesh Bank has initiated a progressive paradigm shift by opening the digital banking gateway. The immediate expectation is that the rigorous evaluation of the initial five institutions will proceed alongside a predictable framework that welcomes further qualified institutions over time. The objective is not merely expanding institutional headcount, but constructing an inclusive financial architecture where citizens can securely, affordably, and autonomously access modern financial tools.

Author || Global Ambassador for Responsible AI and Antimicrobial Resistance; Chief Executive Officer, Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (BNNRC).

Editor's Note || The arguments and systemic insights presented in this article represent the author's own professional analysis. Published with editorial standardization to support informed discourse on sustainable financial inclusion, digital banking architecture, and progressive economic modernization.

Food Safety in E-Commerce: Supply Deficits, Streamlined UBID, and Consumer Rights

Staff Correspondent — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 22:00:48 +0600

Economic input calculations confirm that heavily discounted online ghee, honey, and mustard oil are largely synthetic adulterations.
Over 90 percent of 300,000+ social media food merchants operate entirely outside formal statutory and tax registers.
The UBID framework must transition to a frictionless, automated e-TIN style system issued within 10 minutes.
Mandating verified UBID credentials across logistics and courier networks will automatically eliminate fraudulent sellers.
Packaged products must integrate scannable BSTI verification QR codes, supported by active consumer complaint filings.

With the rapid proliferation of e-commerce and Facebook-based f-commerce across Bangladesh, the dynamics of online food retail have undergone a profound transformation. Driven by seamless digital payments and doorstep delivery networks, retail volumes for ghee, raw honey, mustard oil, powdered spices, herbal formulations, artisanal yogurt, and homemade confectionery have surged exponentially. Deceptive branding claims such as "100% Pure," "Organic," "Cold-Pressed," and "Homemade" routinely mislead digital consumers, generating millions in daily turnover. Yet, beneath these alluring promotional campaigns lies a profound structural disconnect among raw material supply, counterfeit BSTI credentials, and institutional oversight—fueling an escalating public health emergency.

Estimates from the e-Commerce Association of Bangladesh (e-CAB) and the Digital Commerce Research and Advocacy Forum (DCRAF) indicate that Bangladesh's digital commerce market now exceeds BDT 25,000 crore, with food and daily essentials constituting nearly a quarter of this total. However, while formally registered digital retailers number only around a thousand, over 300,000 micro-merchants operate via unregulated social media pages. More than 90 percent of these food vendors lack basic municipal trade licenses, VAT registrations, BSTI certifications, or mandatory clearances from the Bangladesh Food Safety Authority (BFSA). The laboratory reports displayed on these digital storefronts are predominantly fabricated or outdated, with virtually zero institutional capacity to verify product batches for domestic bakeries or open herbal products.

Market inspections and laboratory analyses by statutory regulators reveal severe adulteration across primary food categories. Commercial ghee distributed online frequently contains zero milk fat; butterfat is routinely substituted with palm olein, industrial vegetable fats, synthetic essences, and toxic dimethyl yellow dyes. Mustard oil is fortified with industrial mineral oils and artificial pungency chemicals. Genuine honey is replaced with thermally degraded sugar and glucose syrups, which destroy active natural enzymes and increase risks of non-alcoholic fatty liver disease and diabetes. Similarly, ground spices are contaminated with textile dyes, brick dust, and toxic lead chromate, while unregulated herbal preparations secretly incorporate synthetic corticosteroids that induce chronic renal and hepatic failure.

The systemic prevalence of counterfeit foods is conclusively proven through simple macroeconomic supply-demand models:

Ghee: Department of Livestock Services data indicates national liquid milk production stands at 14 million metric tons against an annual domestic demand exceeding 15 million metric tons. Producing one kilogram of genuine ghee requires 16 to 20 liters of fresh cow's milk. At BDT 70–80 per liter of raw milk, foundational input costs alone range from BDT 1,100 to 1,400. Factoring in processing, packaging, and cold-chain logistics, authentic ghee cannot be manufactured below BDT 1,400–1,600 per kilogram, dictating a baseline retail price of BDT 1,800–2,500. Yet, digital platforms are saturated with products priced at BDT 700–1,000, confirming the predominance of hydrogenated oils.
Mustard Oil: Department of Agricultural Extension statistics reflect an annual domestic harvest of 1.1–1.2 million metric tons of mustard seed, yielding a theoretical ceiling of 400,000 to 450,000 metric tons of edible oil against total national consumption of 2.4–2.5 million metric tons. Despite this profound structural deficit, online claims of "pure expeller-pressed" mustard oil are overwhelmingly diluted with artificially flavored palm oil.
Honey: Domestic yield from the Sundarbans and commercial apiculture yields roughly 10,000 to 12,000 metric tons annually, contrasting starkly with commercial retail volumes exceeding 20,000 metric tons. Industrial sugar syrups account for the deficit.

Despite the existence of the Consumer Rights Protection Act (2009), the Food Safety Act (2013), the BSTI Act (2018), and the Digital Commerce Operation Guidelines (2021), institutional enforcement remains constrained. Because social media sellers lack physical corporate premises, mobile judicial courts cannot easily execute spot inspections. Shutting down non-compliant pages yields minimal impact, as rogue operators instantly migrate to new digital pseudonyms.

Overcoming this administrative inertia requires fundamentally overhauling the Ministry of Commerce's Unique Business Identification (UBID) regime. Bureaucratic complexity and excessive documentation requirements have historically suppressed adoption, leaving only a negligible fraction of merchants onboarded. The UBID framework must transition into an automated, zero-cost, API-driven self-service portal linked directly to national identification registries—replicating the frictionless efficiency of the electronic tax identification (e-TIN) system to issue credentials within 10 minutes. A transparent national merchant registry would empower institutions like DCRAF and state regulators to enforce data-driven compliance.

Simultaneously, binding regulatory mandates must be imposed upon major logistics and courier intermediaries. Courier aggregators should be barred from booking commercial food consignments originating from vendors lacking verified UBID credentials, instantly disenfranchising illegal digital networks. Furthermore, statutory standards for terms like "Organic" and "Homemade" must be codified, with mandatory verification QR codes on product packaging linking directly to dynamic BSTI compliance databases.

Ultimately, proactive consumer awareness remains an essential defense. Citizens must look beyond misleading discounts and verify physical corporate addresses, valid trade licenses, and statutory UBID numbers prior to checkout. Retaining digital payment slips, commercial invoices, and chat logs enables actionable recourse. Under Section 76 of the Consumer Rights Protection Act, complainants filing written grievances within 30 days are entitled to receive 25 percent of any administrative fine levied against offending merchants.

Online food commerce represents a vital economic pillar for Bangladesh. However, unregulated adulteration syndicates severely jeopardize public health and erode institutional trust. Comprehensive digital identification through frictionless UBID protocols, logistics accountability, and strict regulatory enforcement are imperatives to preserve market integrity.

Author || E-Commerce Analyst and Founding Member, e-Commerce Association of Bangladesh (e-CAB).

Editor's Note || The data and institutional analyses expressed in this article represent the author's own insights. Published with editorial standardization to support public health safety, institutional governance, and the sustainable evolution of digital commerce.

The False Divide: Digital Violence Is Real Violence and a Crisis of Citizenship

Senior Staff Correspondent — Mon, 21 Sep 2026 00:27:23 +0600

Logging off is an eviction from democratic participation, not a legitimate remedy for online harassment.
Physiological stress responses and trauma from digital threats mirror physical intimidation.
The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics indicates 89% of surveyed female social media users have faced online abuse.
Waiting for physical bruises before categorizing harm leaves synthetic and AI-generated digital violence unpunished.
Distress calls to Helpline 109 reflect direct constraints on women's livelihoods, education, and public visibility.

There remains a polite reflex, still common in newsrooms and certain courtrooms, that treats online harm as an inferior species of injury: unfortunate, perhaps ugly, but not entirely violence. The recommended prescription is almost always self-help: change the password, deactivate the account, do not feed the trolls. This advice mirrors the older, patriarchal instructions given to women across physical streets and kitchens: leave the room. Yet that digital "room" is precisely where contemporary employment, banking, education, journalism, and democratic politics actively take place.

Liz Kelly’s conceptual continuum of sexual violence was formulated decades before the ubiquity of smartphones, yet it articulates modern digital realities with uncomfortable precision. The primary function of a continuum is not to rank an indecent exposure beneath sexual assault; it demonstrates that disparate practices share an identical purpose: restricting women’s access to public space and demonstrating to spectators the punitive cost of visibility. Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) does not replace physical violence and confinement; it extends and amplifies them through connected devices, platform architectures, and synthetic media. A physical stalker and a coordinated doxxing swarm do not belong to separate spheres—they represent a unified perpetrator using two interconnected doors.

The physiological body records every blow. Sleep fractures. Cortisol does not differentiate between a menacing footstep in an alleyway and a targeted digital smear campaign. Women retreat first from comment threads, then from journalistic bylines, and ultimately from public leadership candidacies. UN Women reports that 38 percent of women globally have personally endured online violence, and 85 percent have witnessed it; over 40 percent have engaged in defensive self-censorship, and nearly one in five has retreated from professional discourse entirely. In Bangladesh, findings by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) reveal that 89 percent of female social media users have encountered online harm at least once, yet fewer than one in five ever formally reports the abuse. An injury this systemic and chronically under-reported cannot be trivialized as a niche content moderation challenge; it is a structural crisis of equal citizenship.

Legal and judicial establishments continue to falter upon archaic evidentiary dogmas requiring a photographic image to prove physical bodily harm. When non-consensual imagery is computationally generated via artificial intelligence, law enforcement personnel and family members still colloquially ask whether the harm is "real." That inquiry is the false divide at work. The genuine harm lies in the predatory distribution, the family blackmail, the dissolved employment contract, and the traumatic isolation of the victim. Any conception of justice that delays action until it sees a physical bruise will perpetually miss the architectural reality of modern abuse.

In Bangladesh, National Helpline 109 routinely logs distress calls detailing digital extortion, the non-consensual circulation of private imagery, synthetic impersonation, and sextortion. These callers are not expressing subjective emotional discomfort; they are articulating a destructive trajectory that frequently terminates in forced withdrawal from workplaces, classrooms, and community life. An administrative apparatus that merely catalogs these grievances without building actionable investigative capacity has tacitly accepted the false divide as state policy.

Until statutory laws, editorial newsroom standards, and corporate platform architectures recognize digital violence as an unyielding restriction on human movement across public domains—both physical and virtual—the burden of remedy will remain an unfair, privatized task imposed upon the targeted individual. The insistence on establishing unified legal definitions at forums like the Dhaka Dialogue represents an effort to dismantle the outdated "vacuum theory" of the internet. There is no isolated digital vacuum; there are only shared public rooms from which women are continually instructed to retreat.

Author || Chief Innovation Officer and Director General, International Trade, Investment & Technology, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. He is a diplomat and innovation strategist operating at the intersection of international trade, technology investments, and AI governance, actively engaged across Digital@UNGA, education and AI, sovereign compute, and economic diplomacy.

Editor's Note || The systemic assessments and critiques presented in this article represent the author's own policy perspectives. Published with editorial standardization to advance inclusive digital governance, legal modernization, and structural protections for women in the technology ecosystem.

Safety of Women in the Digital Space: Legal Protections Must Move Beyond Paper into Practice

Senior Staff Correspondent — Fri, 18 Sep 2026 09:44:44 +0600

The rapid evolution of technology has scaled cyber harassment and malicious deepfakes targeting women
UNFPA data reveals that over half of women globally lack effective legal recourse against digital violence
Legal reforms must adopt a technology-neutral approach and prioritize consent over the perpetrator's intent
Tech platforms must be subjected to binding 24-to-48-hour content takedown mandates backed by statutory penalties
Modernizing evidence acts and institutionalizing in-camera trials are essential to safeguard victim dignity

We inhabit an era where the boundary between physical life and the virtual sphere has largely dissolved. Yet, alongside this unprecedented technological trajectory, an alarming shadow has intensified: technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV). From cyberbullying and non-consensual sharing of intimate images or deepfakes to digital stalking and character assassination, women and girls routinely encounter evolving forms of online abuse. Regrettably, global legal systems remain fundamentally ill-equipped to guarantee protection in the digital realm, mirroring deep-seated systemic deficits.

Recent analytical findings from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) delineate a deeply concerning reality: more than half of the global female population remains deprived of actionable legal safeguards against online violence. Fewer than 40 percent of nations maintain specialized statutes criminalizing cyber harassment, while civil remedies are accessible in merely 14 percent of jurisdictions. These metrics indicate that even where legislation exists, it fails to keep pace with rapid technological evolution, allowing perpetrators to navigate structural impunity.

International human rights treaties—including CEDAW, the ICCPR, and recent United Nations General Assembly resolutions—unequivocally affirm: human rights offline must be protected online. Operationalizing this mandate requires a forward-looking, human rights-anchored model legal framework.

Four structural principles must underpin such legislation:

Consent: Legal definitions must center exclusively on unambiguous, freely given, and revocable consent, rather than requiring victims to prove malicious intent.
Autonomy & Agency: The law must move beyond patronizing protectionism, recognizing victims as autonomous rights-holders over their data and personal dignity.
Intersectionality: Frameworks must account for compounded vulnerabilities faced by marginalized, disabled, or public-facing women, including journalists.
Transparency & Accountability: State enforcement agencies and major tech corporations must be held to clear public-interest benchmarks.

A comprehensive framework requires balanced criminal, civil, and administrative remedies. Statutes must remain tech-neutral so algorithmic evolutions do not render laws obsolete. Drawing from precedents like the UK’s Online Safety Act 2023, the non-consensual distribution of private media must be categorized as a strict-liability offense, preventing judicial backlogs driven by evidentiary debates over intent.

Simultaneously, binding obligations must be imposed on technology platforms. Emulating mechanisms within the US Take It Down framework and Germany’s NetzDG, platforms must comply with strict statutory windows (such as 24 to 48 hours) for removing non-consensual content, reinforced by meaningful administrative penalties for non-compliance.

Substantive procedural reforms are equally vital. Conventional policing methods are insufficient for securing ephemeral digital evidence and preserving cryptographic metadata. This necessitates specialized cyber investigative protocols, targeted judicial training, and statutory recognition of electronic evidence. Procedural guarantees—including pseudonymous filings and mandatory in-camera hearings—must be instituted to prevent re-traumatization.

Crucially, protective mandates must never be weaponized to suppress legitimate digital dissent or free expression, nor should poorly drafted provisions risk re-criminalizing victims.

The virtual realm cannot remain an ungoverned space. Establishing a safe, equitable digital ecosystem demands cohesive national strategies, adequate fiscal appropriations, and enforceable legal standards. Without guaranteeing women’s safety in digital spaces, broader developmental and equality commitments will remain unattainable.

Author || Specialist on Gender-Based Violence (GBV), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Editor's Note || The views and policy evaluations articulated in this article reflect the author’s professional analysis. This article is published with editorial standardization to further constructive dialogue on institutional accountability, digital rights, and gender-inclusive cyber governance.

Tech City of Shenzhen and the Future of Civic Thinking in Bangladesh

Senior Staff Correspondent — Tue, 15 Sep 2026 21:53:53 +0600

The visit to CIOE, Shenzhen highlighted the seamless convergence of technology, urban planning, and citizen services.
Genuine urban modernization prioritizes public transit, energy stability, low-latency connectivity, and civic welfare over cosmetic skyscrapers.
Chronic multi-agency fragmentation and uncoordinated road excavations remain the primary drain on Bangladeshi urban resources.
Bangladesh must structurally transition from a passive technology consumer into an active domestic manufacturer and innovator.
Sustainable municipal reform requires decentralized local governance, open complaint-tracking dashboards, and strict institutional accountability.

Between September 9 and 11, I had the opportunity to attend the China International Optoelectronic Exposition-CIOE, the landmark high-tech metropolis of Shenzhen, China. A distinguished delegation from Bangladesh—comprising entrepreneurs, tech executives, and key industry stakeholders from the ISP and IT sectors—joined this visit. It is worth noting that participants attended either in their personal capacity or under corporate sponsorships.

During the visit, I met with Nazmul Karim Bhuiyan, Secretary General of the Internet Service Providers Association of Bangladesh (ISPAB); Senior Vice President Saiful Islam Siddique; and Executive Committee members Mithu Howlader, Selim, among nearly 50 industry members. Over three intensive days, our delegation explored emerging technologies, engaged in high-level business interactions, placed commercial equipment orders, and directly inspected advanced manufacturing facilities.

While the CIOEFair stands as a premier global platform showcasing China's industrial manufacturing, commerce, and technological prowess, this journey represented more than a trade fair participation. It offered an invaluable, close-up perspective on how systematic technological maturity, sustainable urban planning, and citizen-centric governance converge to drive national progress.

Observing Shenzhen’s dynamic urban fabric and technological integration led me to a persistent question: As China seamlessly integrates digital technology into the daily life of every citizen, has Bangladesh managed to transform technology into a genuine vehicle for improving citizen wellbeing?

The divergence between Bangladesh and China cannot be measured solely through GDP growth or sheer physical infrastructure. It lies fundamentally in strategic foresight, precision execution, citizen service delivery, technological absorption, empowered local governance, and long-term vision. This comparative lens is not intended to uncritically glorify China’s model nor diminish Bangladesh’s domestic gains. Rather, as civil society advocates in an emerging economy, we must objectively evaluate what practical lessons can be adapted to accelerate Bangladesh's own trajectory.

Shenzhen: A Benchmark for Structured Urban Transformation

Historically a modest border fishing village, Shenzhen underwent historic modernization following Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and its designation as China's first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in 1979–1980. Within a few decades, it emerged as a premier global epicentre for deep-tech research, high-end electronics manufacturing, and hardware innovation.

Shenzhen demonstrates that urban modernization is not merely about erecting glass skyscrapers, multi-lane expressways, or aesthetic monuments. The genuine foundation of a modern city resides in its integrated public transport networks, uninterrupted energy grids, resilient fiber infrastructure, ecological waste management, public safety, quality healthcare, and barrier-free digital public administration.

Every layer of Shenzhen’s ecosystem—from its fully electrified bus fleets and automated traffic corridors to human-centric public spaces—reflects long-range architectural planning. The city balances immediate logistical demands with anticipatory provisions for the next decade's demographic, industrial, and infrastructural pressures.

In Bangladesh, urban development remains largely synonymous with discrete capital projects—such as constructing an isolated flyover, a new bypass, or commercial complexes. However, post-construction lifecycle management, multi-agency alignment, and measurable impacts on daily citizen commutes are routinely overlooked. Shenzhen’s evolution underscores that building concrete structures does not constitute true development unless the infrastructure is functional, resilient, and responsive to the public.

Transitioning Technology from Demonstration to Public Utility

The exhibitions in Guangzhou and Shenzhen showcased industrial IoT, robotics, artificial intelligence architectures, and unified connectivity protocols. Many of these engineering paradigms hold vital relevance for Bangladesh’s modernization roadmap.

Contemporary technology has evolved far beyond consumer smartphones and marketing rhetoric. Today, technology serves as the core utility governing power grid stability, municipal traffic synchronization, potable water networks, remote diagnostics, automated municipal sanitation, and public records security.

Examining Chinese municipal technology clarifies an essential truth: importing sophisticated hardware does not automatically create a "Smart City." True smart governance requires interoperable data architectures, technical civil service competence, an unyielding power grid, low-latency bandwidth, and strict institutional accountability.

In Bangladesh, public discourse frequently celebrates "Digital" or "Smart" initiatives. Yet, on the ground, citizens still navigate physical queues, endure administrative red tape across bureaucratic silos, submit redundant personal documentation, and face arbitrary delays. The true benchmark of digital transformation is reached only when a citizen can secure a birth registration, verify land records, process taxes, or file consumer grievances securely online within clear, SLA-backed timelines. If technology fails to save the citizen time, money, and harassment, it remains mere promotional theater rather than citizen-centric governance.

Addressing the Bottlenecks of Administrative Fragmentation

Managing a high-density metropolis like Shenzhen presents profound logistical hurdles, solved only through coordinated data sharing and unified administrative command.

In contrast, the fatal bottleneck of Bangladeshi urban management is extreme institutional fragmentation. Roads are constructed by one authority, drainage is managed by another, power and gas are administered by separate utility boards, while telecommunications operators cut trenches independently. Consequently, freshly paved road networks costing hundreds of millions of taka are routinely excavated weeks later by a sister utility. The public pays the ultimate price through traffic gridlock, chronic waterlogging, and squandered tax revenues.

Before breaking ground on any primary thoroughfare, statutory mandates must ensure multi-year coordination for underground utility ducts—including fiber, power, drainage, and gas conduits. Development devoid of institutional coordination is fundamentally unsustainable.

From Passive Consumers to Sovereign Technology Producers

Bangladesh has witnessed commendable growth in mobile financial services, smartphone penetration, software freelancing, and e-commerce. Our demographic dividend and tech-receptive youth are immense strategic assets. However, our systemic vulnerability remains our position as passive technology consumers rather than sovereign producers.

We spend billions in foreign exchange annually importing telecom gear, consumer hardware, servers, and enterprise software suites. Concurrently, domestic research in microelectronics, VLSI design, industrial robotics, and proprietary software patents remains nascent.

Reflecting on the CIOEFair, our industrial roadmap must make a strategic choice: will Bangladesh remain indefinitely an import-dependent consumer market, or will we build domestic engineering depth? To achieve structural self-reliance, we must:

Increase national budgetary allocations for targeted R&D;
Foster active collaboration between engineering universities and domestic industry;
Launch national skill accelerators to train VLSI, embedded systems, and hardware engineers;
Implement rationalized tariff and tax incentives for domestic high-tech manufacturing;
Democratize access to venture capital and low-interest credit for early-stage tech innovators.

Power and Connectivity: The Inseparable Lifelines of Modern Economy

In an interconnected digital economy, electrical energy and telecommunications connectivity cannot be treated as isolated luxuries. A transient drop in grid frequency directly risks data center stability, disrupts cellular towers, and paralyzes healthcare and digital financial transactions.

A sustainable digital transformation requires an unyielding power infrastructure, robust grid backup systems, and a nationally redundant high-speed optical fiber backbone. Without underlying infrastructural dependability, digital policies remain fragile.

Empowering Local Governance for Sustainable Decentralization

Over-centralization within central ministries remains a primary bottleneck in Bangladesh’s administrative delivery. Local municipalities and city corporations must be administratively empowered to solve localized urban problems without awaiting central approvals.

Shenzhen’s experience proves that rapid municipal problem-solving requires localized technical capability, fiscal autonomy, and delegated authority. If resolving localized civic dysfunctions requires sign-offs from central ministries, service delivery inevitably collapses.

Local municipal governments must be equipped with dedicated operational budgets, trained technocrats, and autonomous decision-making power. Simultaneously, transparency must be institutionalized through open civic dashboards, enabling citizens to track infrastructure works, service requests, and resolution timelines in real time.

Conclusion

The journey through Guangzhou and Shenzhen reinforces a foundational principle: genuine national development is not measured by macroeconomic statistics or concrete monuments, but by the dignity, security, and quality of life afforded to everyday citizens.

China’s industrial hubs demonstrate how technical innovation, cohesive industrial planning, and accountable urban governance can successfully integrate. While Bangladesh operates within distinct socio-economic realities, adopting the core tenets of integrated planning, domestic engineering capacity, and citizen-first accountability is an immediate national imperative.

The ultimate aim of development is not merely modernizing cities, but uplifting human lives. That philosophy must anchor Bangladesh's technological and urban trajectory for the decades ahead.

Author || President, Bangladesh Mobile Phone Consumers’ Association (BMPCA); Tech Policy and Consumer Rights Advocate, Researcher, and Columnist.

Editor's Note || The arguments and perspectives articulated in this article reflect the author's own observations. They are published with necessary factual standardization to encourage constructive national dialogue on smart governance, technology policy, and sustainable urban administration.

Beyond Algorithms: How Energy and Capital Costs Shape AI's Future

স্পেশাল করেসপন্ডেন্ট — Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:26:44 +0600

AI competitiveness in developing economies is dictated by the unit economics of electricity and financing costs rather than code alone.
Elevated perceived country risk artificially inflates the cost of capital for domestic data center infrastructure.
The "Adopt, Adapt, Advance" framework offers a pragmatic roadmap over resource-draining frontier model development.
De-risking frameworks must enforce strict transparency to prevent sovereign guarantees from subsidizing private sector losses.
Modular, demand-driven compute infrastructure avoids the structural obsolescence of centralized mega-projects.

The future of artificial intelligence will not be dictated by algorithmic elegance alone; it will be fundamentally determined by the unit economics of electricity and capital.

Background research prepared for the World Bank's World Development Report 2026 confronts emerging economies like Bangladesh with a pivotal reality: national aspirations for artificial intelligence cannot outpace the reliability, affordability, and financial resilience of the underlying physical infrastructure.

Global discourse on artificial intelligence often remains preoccupied with frontier large language models (LLMs), massive training datasets, advanced silicon accelerators, and generative interfaces like ChatGPT. For developing economies, however, the digital frontier will be governed by elementary physical and fiscal realities: Is power supply strictly uninterrupted? Is high-bandwidth connectivity cost-effective and resilient? Are compute clusters democratically accessible to domestic innovators? And are core Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) layers—such as digital ID, interoperable payments, and secure data-exchange pipelines—architecturally unified?

The background study De-Risking the Digital Foundations of AI: Capital, Risk, and the Diffusion of AI, authored by Mariana Dahan, Junaid Ahmad, and David Savage for the World Development Report 2026: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, redirects focus toward this foundational substrate. The paper identifies four non-negotiable pillars for equitable AI diffusion: dependable electricity, robust connectivity, domestic compute facilities, and unified DPI. Yet, across developing markets, the elevated cost of capital for these capital-intensive utilities presents the steepest systemic bottleneck.

The Capital Cost Divide

The traditional digital divide was largely binary—defined by who had internet access and who did not. In the AI era, this disparity is deeply financial and structurally asymmetric.

When a hyper-scale data center in an advanced economy secures ultra-low-cost, long-term debt financing, while an identical facility in an emerging market is burdened by elevated risk premiums driven by political volatility, foreign exchange instability, policy ambiguity, and grid reliability concerns, the competitive arena becomes fundamentally distorted despite deploying identical hardware.

As underscored by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), upfront capital intensity is not the sole constraint. Global investors actively factor in regulatory instability, contract enforcement risks, geopolitical exposure, and environmental vulnerabilities. Consequently, when an economy's "perceived risk" outstrips its actuarial reality, the cost of capital surges—metamorphosing a technological disparity into an entrenched balance-sheet disadvantage.

This dynamic reframes the debate around "AI Sovereignty." Authentic digital sovereignty cannot be achieved simply by hosting a domestic data center or training a rudimentary national language model. True sovereignty reflects an economy’s architectural autonomy: the freedom to switch upstream cloud vendors, adopt open-source frameworks, migrate data without friction, and prevent critical citizen-facing services from becoming captive to foreign proprietary monopolies.

For this reason, the World Development Report 2026 urges emerging nations to adopt an "Adopt, Adapt, Advance" framework. For most economies, underwriting speculative frontier foundation models is fiscally imprudent. Value creation lies in consuming accessible open architectures, fine-tuning them on sovereign linguistic and socio-economic datasets, and progressively developing specialized internal capability.

Pragmatic De-Risking Without Sovereign Moral Hazard

The analytical core of the research highlights the deployment of blended finance, political risk insurance, and structured credit guarantees to attract institutional private capital into viable digital infrastructure projects that are otherwise penalized by inflated sovereign risk perceptions. Multilateral instruments, such as those structured by MIGA, have historically compressed the cost of debt for high-impact projects.

However, a stringent policy warning is warranted: De-risking must never degenerate into the privatization of commercial gains alongside the socialization of infrastructure losses.

If the state extends unhedged sovereign guarantees across every commercial data center or cloud deployment, it breeds severe moral hazard. Commercially unviable projects can rebrand as "Critical National AI Infrastructure" to secure public backing, leaving governments saddled with contingent liabilities and hidden fiscal exposure. Risk mitigation frameworks must strictly require competitive procurement, transparent risk-allocation matrices, and quantifiable public utility.

Evaluating Bangladesh’s Foundational Preparedness

Bangladesh enters the AI transition with measurable structural advantages. Research supported by the World Bank under G20 DPI frameworks recognized Bangladesh for constructing foundational layers across identity, payments, and data exchange. The nationwide penetration of the National ID system, the Porichoy verification engine, e-KYC protocols, EkPay, the Binimoy interoperable payment switch, and the MyGov unified portal represent an operational baseline for digital governance. The mandate is not to construct infrastructure from scratch, but to upgrade existing rails into AI-ready, interoperable, and secure nodes.

Yet, structural vulnerabilities persist. While near-universal grid electrification has been achieved, the challenge has pivoted to power quality, tariff affordability, and environmental sustainability. With renewable energy contributing marginally to the national grid and commercial enterprises continually contending with infrastructure bottlenecks, powering compute-intensive workloads remains complex. High-density data centers require redundant power feeds, precision cooling, resilient fiber backbones, and zero-trust cybersecurity architectures.

Avoiding the Grand Monument Trap

Policymakers must resist the vanity of symbolic capital projects. Inaugurating a centralized "National AI Data Center" offers high political visibility, but without domestic software demand, affordable power tariffs, and shared academic access, rapid GPU obsolescence risks transforming such facilities into stranded public assets.

National compute policy should reject the "build first, seek users later" doctrine. Capital allocations must be modular and anchored to tangible domestic use cases: meteorological forecasting, vernacular language preservation, precision public health diagnostics, agricultural monitoring, and automated public administration.

Critically, public financing must prohibit predatory vendor lock-in. Adherence to open standards, portable containerization, and API-driven interoperability should serve as mandatory statutory covenants for any project receiving sovereign fiscal incentives. In exchange for de-risking, data center operators must guarantee compute allocations for universities, domestic researchers, and early-stage tech entrepreneurs, alongside stringent benchmarks on power usage effectiveness (PUE) and carbon footprint limits.

Ultimately, public trust remains the central currency of the AI economy. Algorithmic governance across social safety nets, public healthcare, and revenue mobilization must guarantee statutory data protection, transparent automated decision-making, and accessible citizen grievance mechanisms.

Closing the impending AI divide demands rigorous financial and institutional engineering. The nations that capture the economic dividend of artificial intelligence will not necessarily be those that design the most complex models, but those that establish the most reliable, clean, and cost-effective digital plumbing to operationalize them.

Author || Global Ambassador for Responsible AI and Antimicrobial Resistance; Chief Executive Officer, BNNRC

Editor's Note || The arguments and perspectives articulated in this article represent the author's own analysis. They are published with editorial standardization to advance informed discourse on national technology policy and sustainable digital infrastructure.

Why Code Is Compiled Politics, Not Neutral Engineering

স্পেশাল করেসপন্ডেন্ট — Sun, 13 Sep 2026 01:59:38 +0600

Code is not an objective conduit; it is an ideological framework masked as neutral engineering.
The early cyberfeminist vision was co-opted by platforms optimized to monetize attention.
Foundation models developed predominantly by male teams in the Global North operationalize systemic bias.
Ninety-five percent of deepfake media is non-consensual sexual abuse, targeting women in ninety-nine percent of instances.
Technological neutrality serves as an evasive corporate alibi while software architectures monetize harm.

Code is not a pipe. It is a politics that learned to look like engineering.

For a brief season in the 1990s, early cyberfeminists could still speak of the internet as a place where the body might be left at the door. Avatars would dissolve gender. Networks would flatten hierarchy. That wager was never foolish; it was incomplete. The platforms that followed were built by commercial enterprises, trained on the unfiltered vernacular of the street and the barracks, and monetised by engineering the capture of human attention. Technofeminism’s correction is now unavoidable: technology is not a neutral tool waiting to be used well or badly. It is a mirror, and subsequently a megaphone, of the society that finances, staffs, and scrapes data to construct it.

When the corporate laboratories shipping foundation models remain overwhelmingly male and geographically clustered within a handful of Global North jurisdictions, the resulting systems do not merely “reflect bias” as an incidental residue. They operationalise an ideological standpoint. Training corpora remain saturated with the continuum of sexualised contempt that feminist critique conceptualised long before graphics processing units became commercially cheap. Evaluation suites still treat English-language toxicity as the universal baseline for human harm. Safety policies collapse non-consensual sexual deepfakes into a generic administrative taxonomy labelled "adult content." None of this represents an accidental glitch in an otherwise neutral apparatus; it is precisely what an entrenched political order looks like when it is compiled into binary execution.

The systemic consequence is no longer speculative. Up to ninety-five per cent of deepfake material circulating across the web comprises non-consensual sexual imagery, and ninety-nine per cent of the individuals targeted are women. What historically required a darkroom, specialized tools, and a stolen physical print now demands only a consumer application and ninety seconds of automated processing. The model did not manufacture the predatory impulse; it industrialised it, scaling distribution as an integrated feature available to anyone with bandwidth. The rhetoric of technological neutrality remains the institutional alibi that allows the vendor to deflect culpability toward the end-user while the underlying system architecture generates recurring yields.

Abandoning the myth of neutrality is not a reactionary call to dismantle computational tools. It is an imperative to govern system design parameters as binding public decisions: whose data is harvested; which specific structural harms are articulated in the model's constitution; which linguistic corpora are deployed to evaluate refusal thresholds; who populates the adversarial red-teaming units; and whose lived testimony is believed when an automated classifier overlooks a threat because it was phrased in Bengali or framed through honorific societal codes rather than overt vulgarity. These interventions are not decorative diversity gestures; they represent the raw politics of the technology stack.

If algorithmic violence against women is to be structurally dismantled rather than technologically scaled, the primary intellectual concession required of software engineers, venture capitalists, and regulatory ministries is unequivocal: code is political. Strategic dialogues, such as the one convening in Dhaka, exist precisely because this principle must still be contested within institutions that remain determined to discuss innovation in sterile isolation. Until this reality is institutionalized, every peripheral reform—cryptographic watermarking, administrative takedowns, forensic investigative training, and national action plans on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)—will remain an exercise in mopping an inundated floor while the main valve remains wide open.

Editor's Note || The arguments and systemic critiques articulated in this article reflect the author's own policy analysis. Published with editorial standardization to further critical discourse surrounding technology governance, algorithmic ethics, and structural gender equity.

Illegal Cash-Out via Bangla QR: Threatening Bangladesh's Cashless Vision

Senior Staff Correspondent — Sat, 12 Sep 2026 10:19:05 +0600

Merchant QR codes are systematically misused to dispense physical cash without underlying retail purchases.
Unscrupulous agents extract standard cash-out fees from consumers on completely free merchant payment channels
Substantial corporate tax and the mandatory 15% statutory VAT on cash-out transactions are routinely evaded.
Deficient on-site KYC verification threatens the economic survival of millions of legitimate grassroots MFS agents
Misrouted payment flows risk triggering BFIU Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), exposing regular citizens to legal liabilities.

The most critical policy milestone in the history of digitizing and modernizing Bangladesh's financial transaction infrastructure has been the universal, interoperable payment framework known as 'Bangla QR'. Bangladesh Bank introduced this standardized national QR with the firm commitment to reduce dependency on paper currency and establish a seamless, secure, and transparent 'Cashless Society'.

Under the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) and the overarching blueprint of the Payment Systems Department of Bangladesh Bank, the primary objective of creating an integrated payment ecosystem was to curb the government's colossal cash management expenditures. Minting paper notes, vaulting, physical security, transportation, and cash processing across commercial banks cost the national exchequer an estimated BDT 20,000 to 25,000 crore (200-250 billion) annually. The long-term vision of this digital blueprint was to cut this operational waste by at least 50 percent.

To advance this vision, the Ministry of Commerce, national reform steering frameworks, amended digital commerce policies, and the National Board of Revenue (NBR) have jointly facilitated tax rebates, relaxed Merchant Discount Rates (MDR), and provided incentive schemes to onboard Cottage, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (CMSMEs) into modern digital rails. The ultimate ambition was to bring every micro-merchant—from tiny roadside betel-leaf stalls to rural wet-market grocers—under structured digital commercial payment networks.

However, in stark contrast to this groundbreaking policy ambition, an acute operational irregularity and malpractice has surfaced at the grassroots. A nexus of Mobile Financial Service (MFS) agents and opportunistic shopkeepers has illegally repurposed the designated 'Merchant Payment' mechanism into an unregulated, parallel 'Cash-Out' channel. This systemic abuse not only undermines the foundational premise of a cashless transition, but also exposes public revenue, banking discipline, payment security, and the rural financial framework to severe risks.

1. Mechanism of Camouflaged Transactions and Three-Tier Offenses

Reports indicate that this deceptive practice has proliferated across major commercial hubs in Dhaka—such as Motijheel, Karwan Bazar, Malibagh, Uttara, Mirpur, and Farmgate—as well as divisional and district centers (Chattogram, Sylhet, Bogura, Khulna, Rajshahi, Barishal) and rural flexiload or recharge counters.

When ordinary citizens visit agent points needing urgent physical cash from their personal MFS wallets, they are systematically misled. Instead of initiating a standard agent cash-out, merchants prompt customers to scan a commercial bank or fintech 'Bangla QR' displayed on the counter to execute a 'Payment'. Unaware of the technical and legal distinction between a commercial payment and an agent cash-out, customers complete a merchant payment via their apps. The merchant then hands over equivalent physical cash from their drawer without exchanging any underlying goods or services.

Behind this single fictitious transaction, three distinct and serious legal offenses are being systematically committed:

First, it constitutes a Fictitious Commercial Payment without underlying goods or services. Under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act and central bank directives, the exclusive legal foundation of a merchant payment is the bona fide delivery of merchandise or utility services. Channeling funds as commercial sales without an actual purchase violates basic payment system security and financial integrity rules.

Second, consumer exploitation and unlawful fee extraction. Per strict regulatory mandates of Bangladesh Bank, retail purchases executed via Bangla QR are entirely fee-free (0% charge) for end-users. Yet, unscrupulous merchants exploit consumer lack of awareness to privately charge standard cash-out fees (BDT 14.90 to BDT 18.50 per thousand) in cash or by shortchanging the disbursed amount.

Third, massive evasion of VAT and fiscal levies. The statutory 15% VAT on MFS cash-out commissions, along with corporate income taxes on institutional revenues, is entirely bypassed. Consequently, the National Board of Revenue loses substantial fiscal revenue daily.

2. Onboarding Chaos, Supervisory Voids, and Disruption of Marginal Ecosystems

Industry estimates indicate that over 3.2 million micro and retail merchants have already been onboarded into the Bangla QR ecosystem, routing transactions worth hundreds of crores daily across this unified grid. However, this rapid pace of merchant acquisition has exposed severe gaps in ongoing compliance and oversight.

Commercial banks and fintech aggregators, driven by competitive corporate performance targets (KPIs), have aggressively issued merchant QR codes to conventional MFS agents without conducting rigorous site inspections or Know Your Customer (KYC) verifications. Consequently, commercial merchant credentials are indiscriminately issued without confirming the genuine existence of a retail store.

Simultaneously, a fundamental conflict of interest has emerged. For nearly a decade and a half, regulatory guidelines strictly prohibited operating both an 'Agent' wallet and a 'Merchant' wallet from the same physical shop to preserve financial integrity. With the advent of universal QR codes, this clear structural boundary blurred. Exploiting this oversight, illicit rings have displayed bank merchant QRs at agent desks to operate a parallel, unauthorized cash-out syndicate.

This operational distortion inflicts severe economic harm on millions of legitimate, compliant MFS agents. Rural agent networks are the true operational backbone of financial inclusion in Bangladesh. As unlawful cash-outs divert transaction volumes away from regulated channels, compliant agents lose legitimate commissions and are pushed toward insolvency, threatening basic grassroots access to institutional financial services.

3. Macroeconomic Risks, Money Laundering, and Stringent Legal Provisions

The ramifications of this malpractice extend beyond unethical merchant arbitrage; it poses multi-layered structural risks to the broader macroeconomy.

First, the proliferation of trade-based laundering and shadow economic activities. Under the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2012, converting electronic funds into untracked cash without legitimate underlying transactions constitutes an offense. Illicit networks can exploit these off-the-record merchant channels to facilitate untraceable capital flows, cryptocurrency settlements, illegal online gambling, and informal hundi remittance networks (Layering).

Second, innocent consumers face severe legal exposure. While ordinary citizens may initiate these transfers naively to obtain cash, automated monitoring at the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) can flag recurring high-value non-retail transactions as Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), dragging unsuspecting users into formal law enforcement scrutiny.

Third, rigorous statutory provisions and central bank regulatory actions. Under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2024, and relevant regulatory guidelines, substantiated evidence of artificial payment splitting or illegal cash disbursement through merchant channels carries mandatory permanent revocation of trade licenses and merchant accounts. All associated bank and MFS accounts of offending entities are liable to be frozen. Furthermore, acquiring banks or aggregators failing to discharge supervisory duties face financial penalties up to BDT 3 million alongside suspension of acquiring licenses.

4. Policy Framework and Strategic Recommendations for Sustainable Resolution

To preserve the transformative advantages of 'Bangla QR' while safeguarding national payment integrity, a coordinated national strategy must be deployed:

Algorithmic Real-Time Tracking: Deploy AI-driven anomaly detection models across the central bank and commercial banking cores. If micro-retailers (such as small tea stalls) register repetitive, uniform, rounded-figure payments (e.g., BDT 5,000, 10,000, or 20,000) at high frequency, the system must trigger automated holds and alert compliance units.
Mandatory On-Site Field Audits: Acquiring institutions must enforce periodic physical site verification audits. Displaying unauthorized merchant QR codes on dedicated MFS agent counters must result in immediate termination of merchant services.
In-App Warnings and Consumer Awareness: Banking and MFS mobile interfaces must display prominent in-app prompts upon QR scan: "This is a Merchant Payment code, not a Cash-Out point. Paying any cash surcharge here is strictly prohibited by law."
Integrated Fiscal and Regulatory Enforcement: The VAT Audit and Intelligence Directorate of the NBR must coordinate closely with the CID Financial Crimes Unit to identify transaction anomalies, bringing digitized tax evasion syndicates to justice.

Bangla QR remains a cornerstone of the nation’s vision for a Smart, Cashless Bangladesh. However, without resolute regulatory enforcement and active grassroots surveillance, this landmark payment infrastructure risks being hijacked into a digital vehicle for tax evasion and unregulated shadow transactions.

Author || E-Commerce Analyst and Founding Member, e-Commerce Association of Bangladesh (e-CAB).

Editor's Note || The views and arguments expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author. Any resemblance to specific individuals or entities is entirely coincidental. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Digi-Bangla Media authorities. The piece is published in its authentic form to preserve open and pluralistic discourse.

When Cybersecurity Becomes Content Control

Senior Staff Correspondent — Fri, 11 Sep 2026 10:33:15 +0600

he proposed amendments raise a serious concern that this is becoming less about strengthening cybersecurity and more about expanding the state’s power to regulate speech and empower law-enforcement and intelligence agencies.

There is no dispute that Bangladesh needs a strong, modern and technology-neutral legal framework to combat cybercrime. The question, however, is whether the latest draft amendments to the Cyber Security Act, 2026 are primarily designed to address cyber threats—or to expand the government’s control over online expression.

The draft discussed at a consultation meeting on 10 September 2026 proposes a new offence covering the publication or dissemination of “rumours and disinformation,” punishable by up to 10 years in prison or a fine of up to Tk40 lakh, or both. It also proposes bringing defamation, “demeaning” content and bullying within the scope of criminal offences, expanding content-blocking powers and changing the framework for trying cyber offences.

The concern is not about combating cybercrime. It is about whether powers created in the name of cybersecurity could ultimately be used against journalism, public-interest reporting, civic investigation and legitimate criticism.

The lifecycle of Bangladesh’s cyber laws

Bangladesh’s cyber-law journey has been marked by repeated changes in names, provisions and enforcement mechanisms.

The Digital Security Act, 2018 was introduced amid strong criticism over several provisions affecting freedom of expression. In 2023, the government replaced it with the Cyber Security Act, although critics argued that many controversial features of the earlier framework remained.

In 2025, the interim government introduced a Cyber Security Ordinance. A Cyber Security Act, 2026 was subsequently enacted by Parliament in April 2026. The National Cyber Security Agency’s official legal archive lists the 2025 ordinance and the 2026 Act separately.

Then, on 1 July 2026, the Cyber Security (Amendment) Act, 2026 was gazetted as Act No. 99 of 2026.

Yet another amendment draft has now emerged. A cabinet committee was formed in July to review and finalise the draft, and the committee held a meeting on 15 July. The latest consultation took place on 10 September.

That sequence matters. The issue is no longer simply about creating a cybercrime law; it is about expanding the powers of a law that was enacted only months ago.

1. The draft raises questions about its own stated purpose

The fundamental test for a modern cyber law should be whether it protects both digital security and citizens’ rights.

That is why the proposed Section 26A deserves particular scrutiny.

2. Section 26A: up to 10 years for a “rumour”

The draft proposes criminalising the publication or dissemination of “rumours and disinformation” in cyberspace, with a maximum punishment of 10 years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to Tk40 lakh, or both.

The most troubling issue is not simply the severity of the punishment. It is the proposed definition of a “rumour”.

The definition reportedly covers unsupported or unverified information, news or claims that create—or are likely to create—confusion, panic, excitement or social instability.

Three questions immediately arise.

First, must the information actually be false?
Not necessarily. Being “unverified” may itself be enough.

Second, must there be an intention to mislead?
The proposed concept of disinformation carries an intentionality element, but the proposed definition of “rumour” does not appear to establish the same safeguard with equal clarity.

Third, must actual harm occur?
Again, apparently not. The possibility of harm or instability may be sufficient.

That is where journalism enters the danger zone.

Journalism often means publishing information before the government has officially confirmed it. A report may be unverified at the time of publication and later prove to be completely accurate. If the legal test focuses on its status at the time of publication rather than its truthfulness or the journalist’s intent, legitimate reporting could become vulnerable.

That would create risks not only for professional journalism but also for citizen journalism, whistleblowing and public-interest advocacy.

A disproportionate punishment structure?

The proposed 10-year maximum sentence under Section 26A also raises questions about proportionality.

The punishment would sit alongside offences involving cyber fraud, attacks on critical information infrastructure and cyberterrorism. The issue is therefore not whether misinformation should be addressed. It is whether the definition of the offence and the severity of the punishment are proportionate to the actual harm involved.

A modern cyber law must punish genuine malicious conduct without criminalising the normal uncertainty inherent in reporting breaking news.

3. Why are safeguards missing where speech is regulated?

The broader cyber-law framework recognises the need for legitimate exceptions in areas such as law enforcement, criminal investigations, medical treatment, authorised research, education and public-interest whistleblowing.

If lawmakers recognise the importance of such safeguards elsewhere in the same legislation, similar protections should be considered for journalism, satire, research, fair criticism and public-interest communication.

Their absence from speech-related offences is therefore difficult to dismiss as a minor drafting issue.

4. Defamation and “demeaning” content return

The draft proposes adding defamation, “demeaning” content and bullying to the existing list of offences covering sexual harassment, blackmail, revenge pornography, sextortion and child sexual-abuse material. It also proposes higher penalties.

There should be little disagreement over stronger protection for children or tougher penalties for sextortion and sexual exploitation.

The problem arises when online defamation and an expansive concept of “demeaning” conduct are placed in the same criminal framework.

Where does legitimate criticism end and criminal conduct begin?

If the definition of “demeaning” is broad enough to encompass negative reviews, accountability journalism, cartoons, satire or memes, the boundary between criticism and criminality becomes dangerously blurred.

The issue becomes even more serious when arrest and trial mechanisms are considered.

5. Should cyber offences be tried through mobile courts?

The draft proposes dividing cyber offences among different judicial forums. Certain serious offences would remain under cyber tribunals, while others would go to first-class magistrate courts. Some offences could also become subject to mobile-court proceedings if included in the relevant schedule.

This raises a structural concern.

Cybercrime cases increasingly involve digital forensics, metadata, audio-visual authentication, source verification and the detection of AI-generated or manipulated content. The draft itself acknowledges the possibility of audio and video being created or edited using artificial intelligence.

How, then, can a summary mobile-court process reliably determine whether a screenshot, recording or video is authentic—or whether it has been digitally manipulated?

Speed cannot become a substitute for due process.

6. Who gets the power to block online content?

The proposed amendment would expand the authority to remove or block content beyond law-enforcement agencies to include the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and other agencies or forces authorised by the government.

The phrase “other authorised agencies or forces” deserves particular attention.

If the law does not clearly define who can exercise such powers and under what judicial or administrative safeguards, the scope of executive authority can expand through administrative decisions.

The draft also proposes bringing “disinformation or rumours,” defamatory content concerning individuals or institutions, and content deemed insulting to the state within the blocking framework.

The phrase “insulting to the state” is especially problematic if it lacks a precise statutory definition.

A modern content-regulation system must also guarantee transparency and effective remedies. When content is blocked, the government should disclose what was blocked, why it was blocked and under what legal authority.

More importantly, a person affected by a blocking decision should have access to an independent and meaningful appeal process. A system in which the same agency that blocks content also decides whether its own decision should be reversed would raise obvious concerns about impartiality.

7. Less oversight, more immunity?

The proposed amendment reportedly seeks to change the meeting frequency of the National Cyber Security Council from at least once every three months to once every six months.

That proposal becomes significant if the same draft is simultaneously expanding executive powers to block and remove online content.

Even more important is the proposed immunity for officials. The draft reportedly seeks protection from civil or criminal proceedings for the council’s chairman, members and authorised officials for acts carried out in “good faith”.

Good-faith protection can have a legitimate role in public administration. But it must be narrowly defined, subject to oversight and never become a blanket shield against abuse of power.

The real question

Bangladesh needs a modern cyber law.

Artificial intelligence, deepfakes, ransomware, malware, identity theft, cyber fraud and attacks on critical information infrastructure are genuine threats. The state must have effective tools to address them.

But security and control are not the same thing.

A modern cyber law should protect citizens’ digital rights while safeguarding critical infrastructure, government systems, businesses and personal data.

The danger begins when vague concepts such as “rumour”, “disinformation”, “demeaning”, “insulting to the state” or “likely to cause instability” become the basis for long prison sentences and broad executive powers.

The government can explain why further amendments are necessary so soon after the Cyber Security Act, 2026 was enacted. But the legislative process must also answer a more fundamental question: are we strengthening cybersecurity, or are we rebuilding older mechanisms for controlling speech under a new legal label?

Bangladesh spent years moving away from the controversial architecture of the Digital Security Act.

If the new framework brings back similarly vague definitions, disproportionate penalties, broad blocking powers, weak remedies and extensive official immunity, changing the name of the law will not change the nature of the problem.

Bangladesh needs a strong cyber law. But that law should make citizens safer—not silent.

Author: Policy Technologist, Data Scientist and Researcher

Editorial Note || The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Digital Bangla Media. To uphold diversity of opinion, Tech-Thought is published without editorial censorship.

Flexible Silicon, Bangladesh’s Big Ambition

Senior Staff Correspondent — Thu, 10 Sep 2026 08:33:47 +0600

Today, Apple has entered the foldable-phone era with its first foldable iPhone, the iPhone Duo. Apple, of course, is not the first. Years ago, Samsung and several other companies entered the foldable-phone market. Long before that, researchers such as John Rogers had already pioneered remarkable work in flexible and stretchable electronics.

But 13 years ago, another team was asking a somewhat different question.

Not a new exotic material. Not plastic electronics.

Could high-performance electronics be built on industry-standard bulk monocrystalline silicon wafers using conventional CMOS-compatible processes—and could that very silicon later be made flexible? Could we do this while retaining the core advantages of performance, scalability and semiconductor manufacturing?

John Rogers and other researchers had already explored approaches involving silicon-on-insulator (SOI), silicon (111) and other forms of silicon for flexible electronics. Those approaches, however, came with limitations involving substrate cost, defect density or performance. Our question was more direct: could the bulk silicon (100) wafers used by the mainstream semiconductor industry themselves become the foundation for flexible electronics?

On September 10, 2013, our research paper, “Can We Build a Truly High Performance Computer Which is Flexible and Transparent?”, was published in Scientific Reports. The work demonstrated that high-performance silicon electronics could be converted into flexible and semi-transparent electronics using bulk silicon (100) wafers and conventional microfabrication techniques compatible with CMOS processing.

The resulting silicon fabric was roughly 15–17.5 micrometers thick and could be bent to a radius of about 5 millimeters. The devices incorporated high-k/metal-gate p-type MOSFETs. Importantly, the study also showed that the remaining bulk silicon substrate could be reused through chemical-mechanical planarization.

At the time, Nanowerk described the work under the headline, “On route to building flexible high-performance computers.” The discussion of future applications included foldable, paper-thin tablet computers and smartphones.

Now comes the surprising part. ????

The work was not done at MIT, Stanford or in Silicon Valley. It was carried out in the desert of Saudi Arabia, at the Integrated Nanotechnology Lab of the then-newly established King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).

The paper was authored by Jhonathan P. Rojas, Galo A. Torres Sevilla and me, Muhammad M. Hussain. Our affiliation was the Integrated Nanotechnology Lab at KAUST.

Alhamdulillah, that team was ours.

We are not claiming that we built the foldable phones that Apple or Samsung sells today. Nor did we invent flexible electronics. Our question was different: could high-performance silicon electronics be made flexible without abandoning the existing semiconductor ecosystem?

Alhamdulillah, we showed that it could.

KAUST was new at the time. Few people viewed Saudi Arabia as a technology frontier. Perhaps that is why the work did not receive all the limelight it deserved.

But science has no passport.

And innovation has no postcode.

That is precisely where this story connects with the audacious vision of Silicon River Bangladesh.

Today, someone may ask: Why should Bangladesh think about advanced memory, agentic AI, AIoT, digital twins, specialized testing, automated assembly, packaging, strategic fabrication, intellectual property or product development?

Where is the capability?

My answer is simple.

Capability does not always exist before you begin. Capability is built by doing the work.

If a new university in the desert could ask a question about the future of flexible high-performance computing in 2013, why should Bangladesh not ask fundamental questions about the future of semiconductors and deep tech in 2026?

Entering the market as a low-cost service provider after someone else’s technology has already succeeded is easy.

Our ambition is to sit at the table where knowledge, intellectual property, products and companies are created—before that future becomes obvious.

Because by the time the future becomes obvious, the most valuable chairs have usually already been taken.

Silicon River wants to put Bangladesh’s name on one of those chairs.

Insha’Allah. Bangladesh.

References:
Jhonathan P. Rojas, Galo A. Torres Sevilla & Muhammad M. Hussain, “Can We Build a Truly High Performance Computer Which is Flexible and Transparent?”, Scientific Reports, September 10, 2013.
Nanowerk, “On route to building flexible high-performance computers,” September 2013.

Author || Chief Architect, Silicon River; Professor, Purdue University, Indiana, USA

Editorial Note || The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Digital Bangla Media. To uphold diversity of opinion, Tech-Thought is published without editorial censorship.

Bangladesh Needs Energy-Market Expertise

Senior Staff Correspondent — Wed, 09 Sep 2026 11:57:51 +0600

Bangladesh urgently needs the right expertise in energy procurement. Historically, this is an area where the country has suffered significant losses. We still lack the institutional capacity to consistently buy fuel at the right time, at the right price and with the right risk-management strategy.

Based on available calculations, Bangladesh could be spending roughly $250 million more each year on its 110–115 LNG cargoes because of the gap between procurement prices and international benchmarks. The precise figure, however, depends on the benchmark, delivery window and methodology used for comparison.

The situation has become more difficult in 2026. The war in the Middle East, disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz and volatility in the global LNG market have forced Bangladesh to procure a growing number of spot cargoes at elevated prices.

On 24 August 2026, for example, the government approved two September LNG cargoes at more than $24 per MMBtu—one from POSCO International at $24.625 and another from TotalEnergies Gas & Power at $24.25 per MMBtu.

Bangladesh’s 2026 annual delivery plan initially envisaged 115 LNG cargoes, combining long-term contracts, short-term arrangements and spot purchases.

QatarEnergy, one of Bangladesh’s largest long-term suppliers, also cut its planned deliveries amid disruptions caused by the regional conflict. That forced Bangladesh to turn increasingly to alternative sources and the spot market.

This experience exposes a deeper structural problem.

1. Fuel planning must be based on equations, not administrative judgment

Under the current system, major fuel-planning decisions ultimately move through the energy ministry. Petrobangla or BPC prepares procurement proposals based on market requirements, after which the files move through the ministry and receive approval before going to the Cabinet Committee on Government Purchase.

The process can be represented as:

BPC/Petrobangla → Ministry → Cabinet Committee → Ministry → BPC/Petrobangla.

The file goes up, gets approved and comes back down. Only then does the actual procurement begin.

Such administrative oversight is necessary. But energy markets move far faster than bureaucratic files.

If every cargo is treated as a separate retail-style procurement, Bangladesh loses the opportunity to lock in prices when the market is favourable.

The 24 August purchases illustrate the problem. The two cargoes were approved at $24.625 and $24.25 per MMBtu. Only days earlier, another cargo had been approved at $23.93, while two earlier August cargoes were approved at $21.778 and $21.878.

The question is therefore not simply whether a particular cargo is expensive.

The real question is whether Bangladesh is anticipating the market—or approaching the market only after a crisis has already emerged.

Fuel planning should not depend on the personal market experience of a minister or secretary.

Fuel planning should be built on engineering, economics, demand forecasting, market intelligence and risk modelling.

That requires accurate load forecasting.

Data should come not only from substations, utilities and distribution authorities, but also from business associations, industrial clusters, EPZs, BEZA, BEPZA, high-tech parks and other emerging centres of industrial demand.

One example illustrates the problem. This year, the load forecast was reportedly 12.4%, while actual demand growth exceeded 17%. At the same time, a substantial portion of the forecast demand could not be supplied. That means the system was facing both unexpectedly strong demand and major supply constraints.

Therefore, calculating how much gas power plants need is not enough.

We need to know where, when and how much electricity will be required—and then build an integrated fuel mix around that demand.

2. Spot procurement cannot replace long-term planning

A reliable fuel-mix plan should be built around an accurate demand forecast and supported by long- and medium-term procurement.

Bangladesh already has a foundation of long-term LNG contracts with suppliers including QatarEnergy, OQ Trading and Excelerate Energy. Several of these agreements were designed to increase deliveries from 2026 onward.

But long-term contracts also carry supply risk. The Qatar disruption in 2026 demonstrated that clearly.

Therefore, Bangladesh needs not only long-term contracts but also diversified suppliers and alternative supply routes.

There is no shame in admitting that Bangladesh lacks sufficient international energy-market, trading and risk-management expertise.

The solution is to build that expertise institutionally.

3. Build direct and diversified supplier relationships

In the short and medium term, Bangladesh should reduce excessive dependence on third-party trading intermediaries and build direct commercial relationships with major producers and established international energy marketers.

Companies such as Shell, TotalEnergies and QatarEnergy can be part of such a strategy, alongside established global trading houses. But producers and trading companies should not be treated as interchangeable; their contractual structures, pricing mechanisms, supply guarantees and risk profiles are different and must be assessed accordingly.

Bangladesh needs multiple reliable supply sources that can provide continuity and, when necessary, increase deliveries within reasonable limits.

If there is no established purchasing relationship with a supplier, there is no guarantee that the supplier will prioritise Bangladesh when a crisis hits.

4. Buy before the crisis, not after it

Without an accurate fuel plan, Bangladesh repeatedly finds itself buying in the spot market during crisis periods.

At that point, the buyer has little negotiating power because the market knows the buyer has limited time.

The result is predictable: higher prices.

The state needs a balanced procurement portfolio.

That portfolio should combine one-, two-, three- and five-year contracts with fixed or formula-based pricing. At the same time, supply guarantees for the long peak-demand period from April through August should be secured in advance through both domestic and international sources.

Spot purchases should remain part of the portfolio—but they should be planned and limited.

There is nothing wrong with using the spot market for major disruptions, disasters, supply interruptions or sudden demand spikes. But relying continuously on spot purchases throughout a long summer demand window is not a sustainable energy strategy.

Bangladesh’s 2026 experience demonstrates why. After QatarEnergy reduced deliveries, the country had to increase its reliance on spot purchases and alternative suppliers.

5. Energy procurement needs financial risk management

When prices are volatile, market exposure must be brought under professional financial risk management.

Petrobangla and BPC need stronger teams capable of analysing LNG pricing, Henry Hub futures, Brent-linked derivatives, LNG swaps and other OTC instruments.

There is a structural problem here.

Ministers and secretaries are rotating positions. Institutional market expertise cannot depend on the personal experience of whoever happens to occupy a particular office.

The expertise must belong to the institution.

Bangladesh therefore needs a permanent professional team covering energy trading, market analytics, commodity risk management and international negotiations.

The biggest weakness in Bangladesh’s energy procurement system may not be money.

It may be expertise.

6. Move from ad-hoc procurement to portfolio management

Bangladesh’s procurement system still tends to be reactive: identify a shortage, go to the market and buy.

Modern energy markets demand a different sequence.

First, forecast demand.

Then determine the fuel mix.

Then secure supply.

Then structure long- and medium-term contracts.

Then manage price and supply risks.

Finally, use the spot market to cover the remaining gap.

That should be the sequence.

The spot market itself is not the problem. The problem is using it without a strategy.

When prices are favourable, Bangladesh should be able to block future spot volumes or secure prices for future delivery, subject to market liquidity, contract structures and proper risk controls.

That is why demand forecasting, fuel planning and procurement must be integrated into one professional management framework.

The bottom line

Bangladesh’s energy security is no longer simply a question of how much gas is available, how many power plants exist or how many LNG cargoes can be imported.

The real question is:

How intelligently are we buying it?

The volatility of 2026 has demonstrated the risks of excessive dependence on a single supplier, a single supply route or emergency spot purchases.

Bangladesh needs a professional Energy Procurement & Trading Architecture.

That means building a permanent team of international energy-market specialists, trade negotiators, demand forecasters, commodity-risk managers and financial-market experts.

We need to reduce ad-hoc procurement, minimise unnecessary intermediary dependence, diversify supplier relationships and combine long-term and medium-term contracts with disciplined spot purchases.

Above all, energy procurement must move away from political and administrative guesswork and towards engineering, economics, data and market-risk modelling.

Bangladesh’s 115 planned LNG cargoes are not 115 isolated purchases.

They are one national energy portfolio.

If that portfolio is professionally managed, the country can potentially reduce hundreds of millions of dollars in avoidable costs.

If it is not, we will keep returning to the same place:

waiting for a crisis, entering the market late and buying energy at a premium.

Author || Former Adviser to the Interim Government; Engineer and Writer.

Truth Behind the Logfiles

স্পেশাল করেসপন্ডেন্ট — Tue, 08 Sep 2026 22:06:46 +0600

A woman named Maliha reached out over the phone, her voice trembling with sheer panic: "My two-year-old daughter is asleep, but I can't close my eyes. Someone is blackmailing me with private, old photographs."

Naturally, suspicion pointed squarely toward her former partner. Cornered by accusations, he swore under oath, "I swear, I know nothing about this; I have done nothing."

I remained silent.

Often, human beings find themselves condemned in the dock of suspicion despite committing no crime. But where does the objective truth reside? Truth lies buried in the encrypted shadows of system logfiles, dormant sectors of hard drives, or the silent audit trails of Google Cloud.

I took the phone into custody. What emerged was the footprint of a sophisticated RAT (Remote Access Trojan)—with persistent root-level access, an anonymous hacker had infiltrated Maliha’s Google Photos. Startlingly, the former partner was entirely oblivious that his own mobile device had also been remotely compromised.

Here began the rigorous mechanics of digital forensics:

Chain of Custody: Verified the device's cryptographic hash values immediately to preserve legal and evidential integrity.
Physical Acquisition & Core Inspection: Extracted raw physical disk images and audited system root partitions to isolate malware artifacts.
Cloud Forensics: Scrutinized cloud access logs, uncovering unauthorized concurrent logins routed from unfamiliar international IP pools.
Network Forensics: Intercepted active data flows, confirming hidden outbound beacons tethered to a remote foreign command-and-control (C2) server.
Malware Analysis: Reverse-engineered the payload to establish systematic, automated background data exfiltration.

Layer by layer, empirical facts shattered assumption. The former partner was blameless; the real perpetrator lurked silently across the dark corners of the web.

Human bias rushes to judge, but forensic technology remains uncompromised—telling the absolute, unvarnished story. Authentic investigation is not solely about prosecuting the guilty; exonerating the wrongfully accused is an equally sacred pillar of justice.

I am Tanvir Hassan Zoha, Prosecutor. On my forensic keyboard, justice never wavers—truth merely demands precision to unveil itself. People search for culprits in their immediate surroundings, yet the actual adversary frequently hides within mobile operating systems, obscure telemetry logs, and cloud histories.

Through digital forensics, truth prevailed: not the former partner, but a phantom cybercriminal orchestrated the exploit.

True justice does not merely apprehend the guilty—it restores dignity and freedom to the innocent.

Author || Cyber Forensic Specialist, and Prosecutor & Investigation Officer, International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), Banglades

Editorial Notes || This piece reflects the author's proprietary insights and investigative analysis. Any resemblance to real persons or events is purely coincidental. DigiBanglaTech.news holds no institutional liability for the analytical claims made herein.

Views expressed in the 'Tech-Thought' column are exclusively those of the author and do not necessarily represent the editorial stance of Digi-Bangla Media. Published without alterations to promote open intellectual discourse.

Does Procuring Tech Truly Equal Digital Transformation?

স্পেশাল করেসপন্ডেন্ট — Mon, 07 Sep 2026 08:33:03 +0600

Deploying high-speed satellite broadband on moving passenger trains marked a commendable leap forward for Bangladesh’s public transit digitization. Yet, within just six months of rollout, the repeated theft of high-value Starlink terminals from multiple intercity trains exposed an uncomfortable truth: acquiring advanced hardware does not equate to authentic digital transformation without integrated security, continuous maintenance, institutional readiness, and rigid operational accountability.

The Paradox of Demand and Asset Vulnerability

On March 13, free Starlink-powered Wi-Fi was experimentally introduced on the Parabat Express, Upaban Express, Sonar Bangla Express, and Banolata Express. Across transit corridors long plagued by spotty cellular signals, the service achieved immediate popularity. Official metrics indicate that passengers across just four trains consumed nearly 18 terabytes (TB) of data—unequivocally validating robust public demand.

Concurrently, however, severe operational vulnerabilities surfaced. A high-performance flat satellite antenna was detached and stolen directly from the roof of the Upaban Express, alongside wireless network transceivers from other trains. In certain instances, replacement units were stolen shortly after reinstallation.

This recurrent breach moves beyond petty larceny; it signals a systemic breakdown in the stewardship and lifecycle security of state-deployed digital assets.

Hardware Deployment vs. Institutional Governance

For a commuter, onboarding takes mere seconds via a QR code scan. However, maintaining that seamless connectivity hinges on an interconnected physical ecosystem: roof-mounted satellite transceivers, onboard routing infrastructure, clean power supply, and wireless access points. Compromising a single node disables the entire pipeline.

With the Secretary of the Ministry of Railways publicly acknowledging structural monitoring constraints and calling for inter-agency coordination, core architectural governance questions emerge:

Who conducts real-time physical inventory checks prior to departure and upon arrival?
Are pre- and post-transit security audits standard operating procedure?
Were these roof-mounted terminals engineered with anti-tamper sensors, geofencing, or silent distress alarms?
How are legal and financial liabilities delineated among Bangladesh Railway, the Railway Police (GRP), the Bangladesh Satellite Company Limited (BSCCL), and the private technology vendors?

Expanding identical setups to water vessels, inter-district buses, and public utilities without answering these questions merely exports security vulnerabilities to wider frontiers.

Discontinuation Is Not the Answer

Terminating satellite transit connectivity in reaction to theft would be fundamentally regressive. The very purpose of an agile pilot deployment is to stress-test technology against real-world vulnerabilities and identify administrative deficits.

BSCCL’s parallel ambition to extend connectivity across bus routes, riverine ferries, and integrated transit subscriptions holds strong macroeconomic promise. Nonetheless, commercial scaling must be contingent upon rigorous, independent evaluations encompassing hardware security, total cost of ownership, service level reliability, and long-term financial sustainability.

The Imperative for a 'Digital Asset Security Protocol'

To protect and sustain public-sector technology investments, an institutionalized protocol must be enforced:

Centralized Device Management: Every deployed asset must be indexed on an automated central telemetry registry.
Tamper-Resilient Engineering: Terminals require physical tamper-proof mountings, automated disconnection alerts, GPS tracking, and remote-bricking capabilities.
Operational Handover Rigor: Station-level staff must be mandated to complete time-stamped visual and digital verification at terminal points.
Lifecycle Cost Integration: Pilot programs must factor comprehensive physical security, insurance, and rapid-replacement overheads directly into upfront budgeting.
Public Transparency: Because public assets are funded through state resources, incident investigations, operational losses, and remediation costs must be transparently disclosed.

The disappearance of Starlink terminals from railway coaches is not the failure of technology; it is an invaluable institutional stress test. The real metric of digital transformation is never how rapidly state agencies procure cutting-edge technologies, but how securely, resiliently, and accountably those systems are maintained to serve the public good.

Author || Specialist in Digital Democracy, Information Integrity, and Media Development; Ambassador for Responsible AI and Antimicrobial Resistance

// Editorial Note // Views expressed in the Opinion column are strictly the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Digi-Bangla Media. Published without editorial censorship to uphold pluralism in discourse

Beyond OTPs: How Payment Passkeys Promise Faster, Fraud-Resilient Digital Transactions for Bangladesh

স্পেশাল করেসপন্ডেন্ট — Sat, 05 Sep 2026 10:15:29 +0600

The appetite for digital transactions in Bangladesh is experiencing exponential growth. Central bank metrics reveal that monthly volumes processed through internet banking and cards consistently average between BDT 45,000 to 50,000 crore. However, running parallel to this digital surge is a persistent rise in cyber fraud and online deception. The ubiquitous six-digit One-Time Password (OTP), long relied upon as the standard protective barrier for checkouts and bill settlements, has become fundamentally compromised.

Local and international cybersecurity assessments indicate that 35% to 40% of digital financial fraud stems from OTP theft, SIM swapping, or credential harvesting via social engineering. Furthermore, erratic telecom networks and persistent SMS delivery latencies cause 10% to 15% of prospective e-commerce checkouts to stall mid-transaction, forcing consumers to abandon their carts.

To resolve this systemic bottleneck, global payments network Visa is introducing its 'Visa Payment Passkey' technology in Bangladesh. According to Sabbir Ahmed, Country Manager for Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan at Visa, the primary objective is to phase out brittle dependencies on SMS OTPs. By leveraging device-native biometric authentication—such as fingerprint scanning, Face ID, or secure device PINs—consumers can authorize digital transactions with near-instantaneous finality.

Under the Hood: Architecture and Global Precedents

Engineered on open standards established by the FIDO Alliance and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), passkeys operate on asymmetric public-key cryptography. Unlike conventional legacy systems that require waiting for bank SMS alerts and manually transposing codes, passkeys eliminate manual input entirely.

When an account holder configures a passkey on their device, an encrypted, non-exportable private key is provisioned within the hardware’s secure enclave. During transaction processing, this key cryptographically verifies credentials directly with the payment gateway and issuing bank. The user merely touches the fingerprint sensor or glances at their front-facing camera to validate the payment.

Globally, over 3 billion accounts have adopted passkey protocols. Across North America and Europe, post-deployment metrics indicate up to a 70% reduction in network-induced cart abandonment alongside an almost total elimination of credential-phishing exploits.

Regulatory Alignment and Sovereign Data Compliance

Bangladesh Bank mandates strict Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) across all retail digital payments. Passkey technology adheres to this directive seamlessly: the registered hardware device serves as the first factor (possession), while the local biometric or secure unlock functions as the second factor (inherence).

Equally significant is alignment with national data sovereignty principles, which prohibit transmitting citizens' sensitive biometric data abroad or storing it on remote banking servers. Passkey architecture guarantees that raw biometric prints or facial scans never traverse telecommunication networks or reside on merchant or cloud databases; they remain permanently locked within the handset's tamper-resistant hardware. The system is structurally immune to server-side breaches.

Transaction Velocity and Macroeconomic Implications

Payment analytics reveal that completing an OTP-based transaction requires 30 to 45 seconds on average. In contrast, biometric passkey authorization resolves in just 5 to 7 seconds.

This temporal efficiency translates directly into broader macroeconomic momentum. Mitigating payment drop-offs caused by delayed SMS delivery will immediately boost e-commerce conversion rates, expand domestic retail revenues, and strengthen digital VAT collections—while advancing the state's cashless roadmap by disincentivizing cash-on-delivery.

For the consumer, social engineering scams are decisively neutralized: malicious actors calling over the phone cannot deceive a user into parting with biometric keys. Furthermore, non-resident Bangladeshis and outbound travelers can complete domestic card transactions effortlessly over Wi-Fi, completely independent of cellular roaming.

Deployment Headwinds and Technical Vulnerabilities

Despite its architectural superiority, roll-out across Bangladesh confronts pragmatic structural hurdles:

Physical Handset Compromise: Should a device be physically stolen and the perpetrator already possesses the handset's screen lock or unlock PIN, an illicit vector opens to authorize payments before the owner remotely revokes access.
Low-End Hardware Penetration: A vast demographic segment remains reliant on entry-level feature phones or low-cost smartphones devoid of certified secure enclaves or FIDO support, barring immediate mass inclusion.
Core Banking Modernization: Deploying Visa’s modern passkey APIs necessitates substantial infrastructure overhauls within the legacy core-banking and acquiring systems of local banks—a capital- and engineering-intensive transition.
Consumer Onboarding Friction: Transitioning users away from ingrained SMS routines toward local biometric prompts will inevitably generate initial hesitation and trust deficits among less tech-savvy demographics.

The Strategic Imperative

With the central bank targeting widespread digitization of retail transactions by 2027, the rollout of payment passkeys marks a timely leap forward. To maximize efficacy, Bangladesh Bank must issue explicit regulatory mandates governing cryptographic tokenization, data boundaries, and mobile device fleet protocols.

Simultaneously, a dual-rail approach is essential: preserving legacy OTP fallbacks for feature-phone demographics while progressively migrating smartphone cohorts toward passkey ecosystems. Through rigorous regulatory oversight and proactive public education, this transition can elevate Bangladesh’s fintech infrastructure into a globally competitive, fraud-resilient benchmark.

Author: E-Commerce Analyst and Founding Member, E-Commerce Association of Bangladesh (e-CAB).

Editorial Note: Views expressed in the Opinion column are strictly the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Digi-Bangla Media. Published without editorial censorship to uphold pluralism in discourse.

Engr. Quamrul Islam Siddique: The Visionary Architect of Rural Bangladesh

স্পেশাল করেসপন্ডেন্ট — Tue, 01 Sep 2026 10:47:48 +0600

Engr. Quamrul Islam Siddique began his transformative journey from just two modest rooms in the Secretariat. From there, operations moved to a rented house in Lalmatia, and within a few remarkable years, the iconic LGED Bhaban rose in Agargaon. That grand edifice became more than just an engineering headquarters—it stood as the living testament to his indomitable vision, relentless courage, and dynamic leadership.

I had the distinct privilege of witnessing the relentless crusade of Freedom Fighter Quamrul Islam Siddique up close. He was a quintessential example of how a technocrat and civil servant can evolve into a transformative national leader. Audacious, indefatigable, and deeply visionary, he fundamentally reshaped Bangladesh’s rural infrastructure. His pioneering work laid the very foundation of modern Bangladesh's rural economy. His trusted companion on this historic path was Engr. Md. Shahidul Hassan, who later served as Chief Engineer of LGED and is currently serving as Secretary of the Local Government Division (LGD).

I hold countless memories of him. He held me in deep affection and trusted me enough to share his candid reflections. As Chief Engineer of LGED, Chairman of the Power Development Board (PDB), and Secretary of the Ministry of Housing and Public Works, he navigated tremendous triumphs and daunting crises. He often recounted the sheer administrative pressure and the professional anguish of resisting unjustified political demands.

He was remarkably outspoken and never hesitated to speak truth to power. I observed firsthand the immense resistance and political obstacles he braved to maintain professional integrity and administrative discipline.

Shortly before his passing, he traveled to Sweden to attend an international water symposium. He called me from there, and we had a long, affectionate conversation. He mentioned that he would proceed to the United States to spend some quiet time with his son and return to Dhaka after Eid.

Tragically, destiny intervened.

I still vividly remember that fateful day: September 1, 2008. I was sitting in my office reading his latest email and drafting a reply, when my phone rang. It was Iftekhar Bhai, then Additional Chief Engineer of LGED.

In a voice overcome with grief, he said, "Quamrul Islam Siddique Sir is no more."

Stunned in disbelief, I replied, "What are you saying? I am literally reading his email and typing a response right now!"

Iftekhar Bhai shared that moments after sending out his emails from his son Saif’s residence in New Jersey, Sir suffered a sudden, massive cardiac arrest. An ambulance was rushed, but he breathed his last before reaching the hospital.

How poignant it is that we write back to reach a cherished soul, yet that message remains forever unread in this mortal world.

A monumental nation-builder left us far too early at the age of 63. Today marks his death anniversary—on this day in 2008, he departed our world.

Generations pass and people fade, but visionary leaders endure through their immortal legacies—etched onto the roads of the nation, embedded in the uplifted lives of rural communities, and cherished across the annals of national memory.

Even after all these years, on a quiet afternoon, I still intuitively anticipate my phone ringing, hoping to hear that familiar, affectionate voice asking, "Naem, how are you?"—knowing all too well that I will never hear it again.

On this day, I remember this extraordinary mentor and patriot with the deepest reverence, love, and prayers.

May you rest in eternal peace in the hereafter.

Writer: Renowned Senior Journalist, Editor, and Columnist.

Quamrul Islam Siddique: A Hero Unsung

S. M. Imdadul Haq — Tue, 01 Sep 2026 01:31:15 +0600

Look at the map of Bangladesh—a delta stretching across 147,610 square kilometres. Wherever the lines of a paved road, a culvert or a rural bridge cut across that map, there is a story of transformation. And behind many of those stories stands a name that Bangladesh has never fully acknowledged: Engineer Quamrul Islam Siddique.

He was not merely a builder of roads and bridges. He was a nation-builder who understood that Bangladesh’s future would be decided not only in its cities, but in its villages. He saw infrastructure not as concrete and steel, but as a means of liberating people from isolation, poverty and exclusion.

The pages of his personal records, along with the history of Bangladesh’s rural development, testify to a man who loved his country quietly, relentlessly and without seeking applause.

September 1 marks the 18th anniversary of his death.

On that day, during the holy month of Ramadan in 2008, Siddique died at the age of 63. Even as his health was failing, he was reportedly writing emails about environmentally responsible, engineering-based solutions for the modern transformation of his country.

Eighteen years later, an uncomfortable question remains:

Have we allowed one of Bangladesh’s genuine national heroes to disappear from our collective memory?

Why has he still not received the Independence Award or the Ekushey Padak, among the country’s highest civilian honours?

And why does his name remain so strangely absent from the national conversation about the people who built modern Bangladesh?

From the ruins of war to the work of rebuilding

The story begins not with roads, bridges or government institutions, but with war.

On April 30, 1971, as Pakistani forces unleashed violence across Bangladesh, Quamrul Islam Siddique had every reason to choose safety. As District Engineer of the Kushtia District Council, he had a secure professional position and the prospect of a comfortable life.

He chose otherwise.

He placed his career, his future and his life at risk and joined the Liberation War.

Siddique played an active role in preparing operational plans for attacks on three important Pakistani positions in Kushtia: Kushtia Zilla School, the Police Lines and the Millpara Wireless Station.

Earlier, on March 30, 1971, thousands of unarmed people had joined the historic resistance to surround Pakistani troops at these three strategic points. Siddique’s engineering knowledge and strategic thinking became part of that resistance.

When a bridge on the Kushtia–Bheramara route was destroyed to obstruct the movement of Pakistani forces, he used his engineering expertise to make the route operational again for the freedom fighters.

The war ended. Bangladesh emerged as an independent state.

But independence left behind a country devastated by war: broken roads, destroyed culverts and a communications network in ruins.

For Siddique, liberation did not end when the guns fell silent.

He simply exchanged one instrument of national service for another.

He put down his weapon and picked up the tools of reconstruction.

The Greek poet Homer, in The Iliad, captured a similar idea of heroism:

“Defeating the enemy with weapons is not the final measure of heroism; true courage is to stand amid the ruins of war and rebuild one’s homeland anew”

Siddique did precisely that.

He refused to be overwhelmed by destruction. Instead, he immersed himself in reconstruction with an extraordinary sense of urgency.

His response to devastation seems to resonate with Kazi Nazrul Islam’s immortal Pralayollas:

“ধ্বংস দেখে? ভয় কেন তোর? প্রলয় নূতন সৃজন-বেদন! আসছে নবীন- জীবন-হারা অ-সুন্দরে করতে ছেদন!”

“Why fear destruction? The cataclysm is the pain of new creation; a new life is coming to cut away the lifeless ugliness.”

For Siddique, reconstruction was not simply an administrative assignment. It was a continuation of the Liberation War by other means.

A technological visionary before technology became fashionable

There was another dimension to Siddique’s vision that deserves greater attention today.

He belonged to a generation of Bangladeshi professionals who had to imagine the future before the tools to build it were widely available.

At a time when computers and digital technology were still largely unfamiliar concepts in Bangladesh, Siddique recognised the limitations of conventional analogue approaches to managing the development of a vast and densely populated country.

He understood that rural development required information, mapping, data and technology.

He introduced pioneering concepts including rural mapping and Geographic Information System (GIS) technology, laying the groundwork for a more modern and data-oriented approach to infrastructure planning in Bangladesh.

His instinct was always to look beyond the immediate problem and ask what technology could make the solution faster, wider and more sustainable.

That intellectual openness echoes the words attributed to Rabindranath Tagore:

“নূতনের আহ্বানকে যে জাতি অবহেলা করে, সে জড়তার অন্ধকারে তলিয়ে যায়। মেধার সাথে প্রযুক্তির মিলনই প্রগতির মূল চাবিকাঠি।”

“A nation that ignores the call of the new sinks into the darkness of inertia. The union of intellect and technology is the master key to progress.”

Siddique understood that principle long before the language of digital transformation became commonplace.

From an engineering cell to LGED

Perhaps his most enduring institutional contribution was his role in transforming a modest engineering unit into what would eventually become the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED).

The significance of that transformation cannot be measured simply by the size of the organisation.

LGED became a central force in extending rural roads, bridges, markets, water infrastructure and other essential connectivity across Bangladesh.

Siddique’s approach challenged the traditional culture of government administration. He had little patience for bureaucratic delay, excessive paperwork and the notorious “red tape” that could turn a straightforward public project into a prolonged administrative exercise.

He was not a man who believed development could be managed simply by sitting behind a desk.

His home often became an informal planning centre, where discussions about national development continued late into the night.

He believed that work intended for public welfare should not be unnecessarily paralysed by procedural obstacles.

The Russian novelist and philosopher Leo Tolstoy once wrote:

“The true strength of an organisation lies not in its rules, but in the will of a leader who can unite thousands of people around a common goal for the greater good.”

That description fits Siddique’s institutional philosophy remarkably well.

There was little room for idleness in his world.

The philosophy of his life seems almost perfectly captured in the familiar words of Lalon Shah:

“কাজের মানুষ কাজের বেলায়, ফাঁকি নাই তার কোনো পাড়ায়।”

“A person of work stands by work when the time comes; there is no place for evasion.”

The freedom of a road

Siddique’s greatest insight may have been deceptively simple: rural connectivity is freedom.

He believed Bangladesh’s real strength lay in its more than 68,000 villages.

A country could not genuinely prosper while development remained concentrated in its cities and rural communities remained isolated.

That belief drove an extraordinary expansion of rural connectivity—from Teknaf in the south to Tetulia in the north.

Roads were paved. Bridges were built. Culverts were constructed.

The muddy village paths that had once isolated communities gradually became lifelines for rural economies.

A road meant more than transportation. It meant a farmer could reach a market. A student could reach a school. A patient could reach a hospital. A trader could move goods. A village could become part of the national economy.

In communities once cut off from modern services, connectivity became a form of social and economic liberation.

Siddique also promoted rubber dams to protect agricultural land and improve water management.

His achievements reflected a powerful belief in human potential—something that recalls Allama Iqbal’s concept of Khudi, or the awakening of the self:

“Raise the dormant power within yourself—your Khudi—to such a height that even God, before writing your destiny, asks you what you desire”

Siddique tried to do something similar at the national level.

He sought to rewrite Bangladesh’s development trajectory through determination, technical knowledge and institutional innovation.

William Shakespeare’s familiar words seem equally appropriate:

“Some people are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them.”

Siddique belonged to the second category.

He earned greatness—not through privilege, political power or inherited influence, but through integrity, intellect and years of work on behalf of ordinary people.

The final hours of a nation-builder

The final chapter of his life is perhaps the most revealing.

In 2008, at the age of 63, Quamrul Islam Siddique died after a lifetime devoted to Bangladesh’s development.

The final pages of his personal records are particularly poignant.

Even about an hour before his death, while his body was failing, his fingers were reportedly still working on a mobile phone. His concern was not his own condition but possible, environmentally friendly solutions to some of Dhaka’s civic problems.

That detail tells us something fundamental about the man.

At the threshold of death, his thoughts were still occupied by the country and its people.

A medal is not the measure—but recognition matters

On this 18th anniversary of his death, the roads of Kushtia, the bridges across rural Bangladesh and the institutional legacy of LGED stand as living monuments to Quamrul Islam Siddique.

Yet monuments alone do not settle a nation’s debt to its heroes.

Eighteen years after his death, the question remains:

Why has a man who fought for Bangladesh’s territorial freedom in 1971, and later devoted his intellect, technological foresight and administrative ability to building the foundations of its economic and infrastructural freedom, still not received the country’s highest national recognition?

One explanation lies in the darker history of partisan politics.

Authoritarian political cultures have often struggled to accommodate people whose qualifications, independence and patriotism do not depend on political loyalty.

Siddique was not known as a political sycophant.

He was a man of work.

He built institutions rather than political networks. He pursued results rather than patronage.

And that independence may have come at a cost.

If his rightful recognition was delayed or overlooked because he did not belong to the right political camp, then the injustice is not merely personal. It is institutional.

Those who shape history do not necessarily work for medals.

But states have a responsibility to remember.

Recognition is not simply a reward for the dead. It is also a message to the living.

When a country honours integrity, competence and service, it tells the next generation what kind of citizenship it values.

That is why awarding Quamrul Islam Siddique the Independence Award or the Ekushey Padak should not be treated merely as a ceremonial gesture.

It would be an act of national remembrance.

It would also help correct a historical imbalance.

Because if a country repeatedly fails to honour its finest citizens, it risks creating a culture in which political proximity matters more than public service—and where genuine nation-builders disappear into the margins of history.

There is a line from Rabindranath Tagore recorded in Siddique’s personal notes that now seems painfully relevant:

“স্মৃতিভারে আমি পড়ে আছি / ভারমুক্ত তুমি হেথা নাই।”

“I remain burdened by memory; you are nowhere here, freed from that burden.”

Perhaps that is where Bangladesh stands today.

Quamrul Islam Siddique is gone.

But Bangladesh is still travelling on many of the roads he helped build.

From the dirt tracks of Kushtia to the institutional corridors of modern LGED, his work remains embedded in the physical landscape of the country.

The man may have disappeared from public view.

His roads have not.

And perhaps that is the most enduring monument of all: millions of Bangladeshis continue to travel every day across the infrastructure he helped create, often without knowing the name of the man whose vision helped connect them to a larger country.

The poet of Bangladesh’s rural roads deserves to be remembered—not because he needs a medal, but because the nation needs to remember what he stood for.

A free country must also remember the people who helped build its freedom.

Author || Executive Editor, Digital Bangla Media

Solar Shift Strategy for Green Revolution: Policy Push for Sustainable, Smart Energy Systems

Saiful Islam Siddique — Sat, 25 Apr 2026 21:52:10 +0600

There was a time when the phrase “burning since birth,” written on the back of fuel tankers on highways, might be ridiculed. But in a twist of time, that phrase has now become a stark reality of the global economy. The geopolitical tensions among Iran, the United States, and Israel in the Middle East are no longer confined to maps—they have reached our kitchens and industrial wheels. Bangladesh is no exception. Seventeen years after witnessing a severe power crisis, even in today’s era of advanced technology, a similar shadow is once again knocking at our door.

However, the solution to this crisis does not lie in imported liquid fuels; it lies in the abundant sunlight above us. If the government seeks sustainable benefits in the coming years, it must move beyond a “duty-based import” policy toward prioritizing “duty-free production” or “local assembling.” Battery hubs must be established for solar energy storage. To reduce petroleum consumption, the use of electric vehicles (EVs) and home appliances must be expanded. This requires indigenous renewable energy, stability, cost efficiency, and long-term energy security.

If every rooftop in urban areas can be transformed into a power station, pressure on the national grid could be reduced by half. The government can, through entrepreneurs, convert rooftops of public offices into solar hubs. By reducing dependence on imported fuel oil and harnessing the country’s abundant sunlight, the energy crisis can be permanently mitigated. In this regard, simplifying solar panel imports is essential. Additionally, to make lithium-ion or advanced sodium-ion batteries more accessible, duties on raw material imports should be reduced to zero, and at least a 10-year tax holiday should be offered to encourage local manufacturing. Long-term, low-interest “green loans” must also be ensured for solar panel installation. As battery costs decrease, solar power will no longer be limited to daylight hours. With such policy support, people across all income groups will benefit.

Similarly, to relieve citizens from the burden of fuel procurement for motorized agricultural equipment—such as irrigation pumps, harvesters, and threshers—electric solutions must be made widely available across agriculture and transport sectors. EVs are no longer just vehicles; they have become a symbol of progress. Special incentives for importing EV components such as motors, controllers, and charging equipment could enable the production of affordable e-bikes and three-wheelers, as well as the development of new vehicles tailored for agricultural and industrial needs. Duty-free EV imports would reduce the number of fuel-based vehicles, lower fuel import costs, and ease pressure on the sector, while also reducing noise and air pollution.

However, introducing EVs alone is not sufficient; adequate charging infrastructure must be ensured. Policies should mandate the installation of DC fast-charging points at every filling station nationwide. Charging stations could also be set up along roadsides, in garages, or through ride-sharing models similar to charging EV networks. At the same time, smart metering systems should offer incentives for charging EVs during off-peak hours, when electricity demand is lower, thereby facilitating grid management.

A significant portion of Bangladesh’s diesel imports is consumed by irrigation pumps. Therefore, increasing government subsidies to convert diesel-powered irrigation systems into solar-powered pumps is essential. This would reduce farmers’ costs while decreasing reliance on fuel imports.

To meet EV electricity demand, simplifying net metering could serve as an effective solution. When citizens see that they can sell surplus electricity generated from rooftop solar panels back to the grid and receive “zero” or even “negative” electricity bills at the end of the month, it could evolve into a массовое движение (mass movement).

Investors, however, will only engage when they perceive long-term policy stability. Entrepreneurs working in renewable energy should not have to navigate multiple government offices. Strengthening the Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA) and enabling a one-stop approval system could streamline processes.

Through a “green energy” movement, if Bangladesh fully embraces battery technology and solar energy today, the term “load shedding” could disappear from the national vocabulary within a few years. The country would no longer burn under energy shortages but instead move toward a sustainable future illuminated by sunlight.

As the discussion draws to a conclusion, a question may arise: why would a telecom sector entrepreneur be so concerned about the energy sector, and why should the government take note? The answer lies in the reality that every call and every data packet in Bangladesh travels through thousands of telecom towers, and keeping these networks operational requires electricity. Much of this infrastructure still depends on diesel generators and unstable grid power. Rising fuel costs, increasing carbon emissions, and vulnerability during crises put networks at risk. In this context, “uninterrupted, clean energy” is no longer a luxury—it has become a prerequisite for the survival of the telecom sector.

Consider a remote telecom tower or an ISP point-of-presence where grid power is unreliable. Previously, diesel generators would run for hours to maintain connectivity. Now, solar panels installed on the tower, combined with lithium-ion battery banks, generate electricity during the day and store it for use at night. Generators operate only in emergencies. This “hybrid power system” not only reduces costs but also cuts carbon emissions by 40–60 percent. For telecom, where even a second of power disruption can result in thousands of dropped calls and data loss, uninterrupted power is critical.

This is where integrated energy storage systems (ESS), large-scale batteries (lithium-ion, LFP), smart energy management software, and the integration of grid, solar, and generator sources come into play. Such systems can transform telecom towers into self-sufficient micro power stations. In a country prone to cyclones, floods, and storms, telecom networks become lifelines during disasters. By combining solar energy, storage, and smart UPS systems, “disaster-resilient networks” can be developed.

Imagine an ecosystem where an entrepreneur establishes an “Energy Service Company (ESCO)” in a rural area, supplying solar power to telecom towers, local businesses, and charging stations. Electricity is sold under a “Power-as-a-Service” model, where operators pay only for usage without heavy capital investment. A telecom tower, once merely a communication symbol, can evolve into a source of energy, a hub of stability, and even a driver of local economic growth.

Bangladesh’s energy sector now faces an uncomfortable reality. The current model is not sustainable—this is no longer a matter of debate. Fluctuations in global oil prices, Middle Eastern tensions, or pressure on the dollar directly impact households, industries, and agriculture. Yet sunlight is available every day. The question is whether it will remain merely light or be transformed into energy for the future.

Statistics indicate that Bangladesh receives an average solar radiation of 4 to 5 kWh per square meter per day—nearly double that of Germany, which generates more than 60 percent of its electricity from renewable sources. This highlights the untapped potential of solar energy in Bangladesh. Experts estimate that utilizing rooftops of industrial, commercial, and residential buildings could generate 3,000 to 4,000 megawatts of electricity. In alignment with this view, the telecom sector’s adoption of this transformation could extend “network coverage” beyond maps into every layer of sustainable development.

Technology is now affordable, investors are interested, and the potential is vast—yet progress remains slow. The barrier is not technological but policy-driven. Without removing duties on renewable technologies, ensuring long-term financing at below 5 percent interest, expediting approval processes (within 30 days), mandating rooftop solar integration, modernizing the grid, and implementing effective net metering, no transformation will be sustainable.

Author || Publisher, DigiBangla; Editor, SaraBangla; Entrepreneur and Senior Vice President, ISPAB

Disclaimer: The views expressed in the opinion section are solely those of the author. The Digital Bangla media authority bears no responsibility for these views. As a reflection of diverse opinions, the article is published without editorial alteration. Any dissatisfaction or reaction remains the personal matter of the reader.

Liberation War in Pixels: Can Games Carry the Spirit of ’71?

S. M. Imdadul Haq — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 16:05:55 +0600

The Great Liberation War of 1971 was fought with weapons—but even more profoundly, it was a war of consciousness. Today, that very consciousness faces a new battlefield: the digital world. The story of 1971 is a complex mosaic of thousands of small human narratives. The question now is how those stories are being transformed into games. Are we merely consuming history at a popcorn level on screens, or are we truly able to convey and absorb its deeper essence? This article attempts to stitch together information, government expenditure, notable games, their development stories, and the controversies surrounding them.

1971— the sound of boots, the roar of rifles, and the voice of Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra crackling through broken transmitters—are now confined to the pages of history. Yet, as the world increasingly revives history through computer and mobile games, a pressing question arises: has Bangladesh’s Liberation War secured its rightful place on this digital battlefield?

To find an answer, one must look back several decades, when game development in Bangladesh was limited to scattered initiatives, constrained technology, and a small market. These efforts were not driven by market demand, but by emotion and conviction. The journey began with Arunodoyer Agnishikha.

In tracing the history of Liberation War–based games in Bangladesh, the first notable mention is the first-person shooter Arunodoyer Agnishikha. Though it was not a commercial success, its historical significance was immense. Developed by local company Som Computers Limited using its own 3D engine, the game presented different phases of the Liberation War. Despite technological limitations, piracy, and market indifference causing its eventual halt, it delivered a powerful message: making games on the Liberation War was possible.

Later, with state patronage, Bangladeshi developers attempted to recreate the Liberation War across various platforms through games such as Liberation 71, Heroes of 71, Battle of 71, and Massive War 71. Some found limited success, while others faded into obscurity. Nevertheless, these initiatives marked the first attempt to offer younger generations an “experience” of history beyond academic texts.

The Beginning: Emotion, Independence, and Pixels
Among the earliest Liberation War–based games, Arunodoyer Agnishikha stood as an emotional endeavor. Although it disappeared amid piracy and market constraints, it inspired a generation of developers. This was followed by Liberation 71, developed largely through voluntary efforts by university students under Team-71. The game gained attention by releasing demo missions based on significant historical events of 1971. Plans were later announced to create separate episodes featuring martyrs such as Bir Sreshtho Abdul Rouf and Bir Sreshtho Matiur Rahman, with improved graphics using the Unreal Engine.

Heroes of 71 became the country’s first widely discussed mobile shooter game, bringing the Liberation War directly to the Android platform. Players participated in an operation set in a rural area near the Madhumati River. While the game succeeded in connecting some young users with historical context, it also faced criticism regarding graphics, artificial intelligence, and gameplay.

Around the same time, Battle of 71 included 3D representations of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and battle scenes from places such as Rajarbagh and the Sylhet tea gardens. With standalone levels, comparatively better visuals, and historical references, it earned a distinct place among Liberation War–themed games. Developers attempted to present internationally competitive visuals by incorporating national leaders’ 3D models and broader battle environments.

Juddho 71: Prothom Protibedon stood out technologically. Focusing on the first resistance of the night of March 25, the game supported virtual reality (VR) and was developed using the Unity engine. It demonstrated that Bangladesh was also attempting technologically advanced game development beyond conventional mobile platforms.

Available data suggest that more than 50 games and applications related to the Liberation War have been developed. These include Muktijuddho, Juddho 71, Bangladesh Liberation War Quiz Game, Muktijuddho Runner, documentary-style app Genocide 1971, Shadhinota 71, Ora 11 Jon, Odommo 71, Guerilla 71, and Guerilla Brothers. While many are educational, others focus on gameplay, quizzes, or interactive storytelling. However, despite repeated patronage from the ICT Division, content diversity remained limited, and general gamers showed little interest. As a result, the mud, dust, and gunpowder of the 1971 battlefield failed to truly reach the new generation through screens, mobiles, or VR.

While hundreds of games worldwide depict World War II, Vietnam, or Middle Eastern conflicts, the question becomes sharper: has Bangladesh’s Liberation War received its due place in digital gaming? Was state patronage sufficient?

Grants, Projects, and Large-Scale Spending
Although the intent of preserving history through digital media is commendable, the reality paints a different picture. Under projects such as “Mobile Game and Apps Development” and various grants and training programs, crores of taka have been spent. Yet, compared to this expenditure, the number of effective and popular games remains negligible.

Reports indicate that vast sums have been allocated to games, apps, animations, and VR projects. However, due to contractor-driven implementation, the effectiveness and outcomes of many projects remain questionable. Whether public funds were used to capture the true depth of history or merely spent on packaged formats has become a widely debated issue.

Spending Disparities: Mujib-Centric Content vs Liberation War Games
A clear imbalance is visible in funding. While large budgets were allocated to digital content centered on Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—such as the animated film Mujib Bhai or the Mujib 100 app—Liberation War–based games focusing on raw historical realities received minimal support. As a result, themes such as refugees, women’s suffering, and political conflict rarely found space in games, restricting creative freedom and historical depth.

The Creativity Gap: “Safe” History and Content Capping
Research suggests that contractor-based management and political-cultural sensitivities often pushed developers toward “safe” narratives—patriotic, simplified plots—avoiding harsh realities and moral dilemmas. Consequently, games failed to explore the multilayered nature of history or personal human stories. The balance between historical accuracy and entertainment is achievable, but it requires transparent guidelines and creative independence tied to grants.

Controversial Grants and Ethical Questions
Investigations have also raised concerns over controversial individuals or institutions receiving public funds. Reports of political affiliations and questionable financial links have fueled debates on transparency and accountability in managing history-based digital projects.

Yet, There Is Hope
Despite limitations, these games have sparked curiosity about the Liberation War among young people. Independent initiatives continue to emerge. The 2019 release The Victory by young developer Rupokatha showed that meaningful digital representations of history are possible even on modest budgets. With proper training, research, and funding, Liberation War–based games can evolve into strong educational tools.

What Needs to Be Done?
The war of 1971 was a war of questions. Yet today, questioning seems discouraged when translating that war into games. If the state truly wants the Liberation War to resonate with the digital generation, games must be seen not merely as grant-driven projects, but as platforms for truth. Otherwise, despite massive spending, these games will remain buried in download lists—far from history.

Future efforts must go beyond shooters to develop story-driven, RPG, and strategy games grounded in rigorous research. The war should be seen not only through the eyes of a freedom fighter, but also through those of a mother, a refugee, or a journalist. Historians must collaborate with game designers. Government support must be long-term, funding years of research, prototyping, testing, and multilingual releases. Ethical considerations and human impact must be overseen by an independent review board.

Let Freedom Return in Victory; Let Truth Live in Games
When a nation’s independence story is presented as entertainment, the responsibility doubles: truth must be preserved, and new generations must be engaged. If the scale of investment seen in Mujib-centric content had been applied to portraying the Liberation War’s stark realities, these games would be far more powerful today. With transparency and collaboration between historians and gaming professionals, our stories can truly come alive in pixels—and then it can be said that the Liberation War lives not only in books, but in games, in hearts, and in digital memory.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, S. M. Imdadul Haq, Executive Editor of DigiBangla Tech, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication.

Advantages of Broadband Internet Over Fixed Wireless Access

Saiful Islam Siddique — Wed, 12 Nov 2025 07:24:31 +0600

As technology evolves, the way we connect to the internet has diversified. Two common options for home and business connectivity are broadband internet (typically delivered via cable, fiber, or DSL) and fixed wireless access (FWA) internet. Understanding the advantages of broadband internet over fixed wireless access can help users make informed decisions about their connectivity needs. The ISPs in Bangladesh successfully deployed the highspeed broadband service from 100mbps to 1gbps throughput up to rural level with a very affordable price using fiber optic technology.

1. Greater Reliability and Stability
Broadband internet connections, especially those using fiber optic or cable infrastructure, are generally more reliable and stable than fixed wireless access. Wired connections are less susceptible to environmental factors such as weather conditions, physical obstructions, or electromagnetic interference, which can affect the quality and consistency of wireless signals.

2. Higher Speeds and Bandwidth
Broadband internet often provides higher maximum speeds and greater bandwidth than fixed wireless access. Fiber-optic broadband, in particular, can deliver gigabit speeds suitable for data-intensive tasks like streaming high-definition video, online gaming, and large file transfers. In contrast, fixed wireless access is typically limited by spectrum availability and signal strength, resulting in lower maximum speeds.

3. Lower Latency
Latency, or the time it takes for data to travel between the user and the internet, is generally lower with broadband connections. This is particularly important for real-time applications such as video conferencing, online gaming, and VoIP calls. Fixed wireless access can experience higher latency due to signal transmission and potential interference.

4. Less Susceptibility to Environmental Factors
Broadband internet delivered via wired infrastructure is less affected by environmental factors like rain, snow, or physical obstructions (trees, buildings) that can interfere with wireless signals. This leads to a more consistent and dependable connection throughout the year.

5. Scalability and Upgradability
Broadband networks, especially fiber, are highly scalable and can be upgraded to support faster speeds and new technologies as demand increases. Fixed wireless access is limited by the capabilities of the wireless spectrum and equipment, making upgrades more challenging and sometimes requiring significant investment in new hardware.

6. Higher Data Caps or Unlimited Data
Broadband internet plans often come with higher data caps or even unlimited data options, making them more suitable for heavy internet users or households with multiple connected devices. Fixed wireless access providers may impose stricter data limitations due to bandwidth constraints.
While fixed wireless access internet can be a valuable solution in rural or hard-to-reach areas, broadband internet delivered via wired infrastructure offers significant advantages in terms of speed, reliability, latency, scalability, and overall performance. For users who have access to both options, broadband is generally the preferred choice for robust and future-proof connectivity.

In Bangladesh, the approval of Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) was granted during the previous administration and led by then The State Minister (Zunaid Ahmed Palak), without public consultation or input from relevant trade organizations. During that period, BASIS, ISPAB, BACOO, and e-Cab were not involved in the consultation process. Throughout the last regime, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) experienced changes in leadership, with several politically appointed Chairmen. These appointments contributed to a perceived shift in BTRC’s autonomy, with some stakeholders expressing concern regarding responsiveness to general telecom operators' interests. There have been many instances of monopolies, duopolies, and even syndicates forming to gain control and capture market share in unethical ways. In the past, a few ambitious businesspeople, often working with politicians, would manipulate the law or exploit the system to gain an unfair advantage over regular operators, leaving no room for fair competition. The new telecom policy promises to benefit FTSP operators, but only if it manages to regulate appropriately without excessive intervention. According to public demand, fixed wireless internet should be reserved exclusively for FTSP operators, while mobile wireless internet should remain under the domain of CMSP operators. This division is crucial not only to public interest, but also to safeguarding the livelihoods and survival of 1 million families working in 2,200 domestic FTSP operators.

Author: Saiful Islam Siddique, Senior Vice President, ISPAB, Publisher, Digital Bangla Media.